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THE REST IS SILENCE: CHEVRON 
DEFERENCE, AGENCY 
JURISDICTION, AND STATUTORY 
SILENCES 
Nathan Alexander Sales* 
Jonathan H. Adler** 
Should agencies receive Chevron deference when interpreting 
the reach of their own jurisdiction?  This Article argues that, in gener-
al, they should not.  The authors begin by identifying and detailing 
the various different types of “jurisdictional questions” that may arise 
in statutory interpretation.  The Article then surveys how courts have 
analyzed these different aspects of the jurisdiction problem, with a 
particular attention directed to statutory silences.  The Court’s Che-
vron jurisprudence strongly suggests that deference to agency deter-
minations of their own jurisdiction should be disfavored, particularly 
where a statute is silent (and not merely ambiguous) about the exis-
tence of agency jurisdiction.  In particular, the authors argue that 
courts should deny Chevron deference regardless of whether an agen-
cy is asserting or disclaiming jurisdiction.  This no-deference rule 
should apply in both existence-of-power and scope-of-power cases, 
but courts should show deference where agencies assert the existence 
of a factual predicate that triggers jurisdiction.  The authors support 
their proposal with arguments drawing on both traditional adminis-
trative law norms and public choice analyses of the incentives faced 
by agencies and other relevant actors.  While there are strong counter-
arguments to their proposal—particularly the potential difficulty in 
distinguishing between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional ques-
tions—this Article maintains that denying deference in the jurisdic-
tional context is desirable and consistent with Chevron principles. 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 ** Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law.  The authors thank Eric Claeys, Jonathan Entin, Kristin Hickman, B. 
Jessie Hill, Catherine LaCroix, Jonathan Mitchell, Andrew P. Morriss, Adam J. White, Todd J. Zy-
wicki, and participants in a faculty workshop at the George Mason University School of Law for com-
ments on various drafts of this Article, as well as Tai Antoine and Andrew Samtoy for their valuable 
research assistance.  Any errors or omissions are either one author’s fault or the other’s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American Bar Association did not take kindly to the idea that 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could regulate lawyers and law 
firms as “financial institutions.”1  The FTC asserted such authority under 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act.2  According to 
the FTC, the law—which was designed to foster competition among 
banks, insurance companies, and other institutions—applied to all “enti-
ties engaged in ‘financial activities.’”3  Therefore, the Commission rea-
 
 1. The FTC adopted regulations defining a “financial institution” as “an institution the business 
of which is engaging in financial activities.”  16 C.F.R. § 313.3(k)(1) (2008). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 3. Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 466–67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting correspondence from 
FTC Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection).  The Act defined a “financial institution” as 
“any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities,” and further defined as “finan-
cial in nature” a wide range of activities, including “real estate settlement services,” and “tax planning 
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soned, insofar as some private attorneys provide “financial services,” 
such as tax and estate planning or real estate settlement services, they 
were subject to FTC regulations implementing the Act’s privacy provi-
sions.4 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit made short work of the FTC’s position—that the Act delegated 
broad authority over all entities engaged in financial activities and con-
tained no exemption for attorneys;5 and that, insofar as the statute was 
“silent or ambiguous” on whether it applied to lawyers, courts should de-
fer to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation of its authority under 
“step two” of the Chevron doctrine.6  According to the D.C. Circuit, 
Congress did not grant the FTC such authority.7  The court denied that 
“Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute does not expressly ne-
gate the existence of a claimed administrative power.”8  A statutory si-
lence on the delegation of power to a federal agency is not an ambiguity 
about the existence of that power.9  Rather, the court held, it is a failure 
to delegate that power.  Deference would only be called for if there had 
been “an implicit delegation of authority” to the FTC.10 
Is American Bar Ass’n v. FTC consistent with the Chevron doc-
trine?  Chevron treats statutory silences as ambiguities that trigger judi-
cial deference to an agency’s reasonable statutory interpretation.11  But 
ambiguity by itself does not give rise to Chevron deference, and a statu-
tory silence is not in itself an ambiguity.  Before deferring, a court must 
first locate other evidence that Congress meant to grant such interpretive 
 
and preparation services,” in addition to many activities more commonly considered financial.  Id. at 
467. 
 4. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(2)(viii), (b)(6)(vi) (2008). 
 5. Am. Bar Ass’n, 430 F.3d at 468 (“The Commission apparently assumed—without reason-
ing—that it could extend its regulatory authority over attorneys engaged in the practice of law with no 
other basis than the observation that the Act does not provide for an exemption.”); id. (“[T]he Com-
mission repeatedly repairs to the position that no language in the statute exempts attorneys from regu-
lation.”). 
 6. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 7. Am. Bar Ass’n, 430 F.3d at 471. 
 8. Id. at 468 (quoting Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 
(D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
 9. Id. at 471 (“[I]f there is the sort of ambiguity that supports an implicit congressional delega-
tion of authority to the agency make a deference-worthy interpretation of the statute, we must look 
elsewhere than the failure to negate regulation of attorneys.”); id. at 469 (“Mere ambiguity in a statute 
is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.” (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 
1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). 
 10. Id. at 469 (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 
1998)). 
 11. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.” (emphasis added)). 
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power to the agency.12  This initial inquiry—what Professors Merrill and 
Hickman termed Chevron “step zero”13—must come first.  Without a 
delegation, an agency’s statutory interpretation is not due Chevron defe-
rence, no matter how ambiguous the statute.  Further, a statutory silence, 
without more, is not an implicit delegation.  Understanding Chevron as a 
doctrine grounded in a legislative delegation reconciles the apparent con-
flict and illustrates why the D.C. Circuit’s approach was correct—and 
why deference to agency jurisdictional determinations is unwarranted. 
This Article seeks to contribute to the definition of “Chevron’s do-
main”14 and the so-called step zero analysis by examining how courts 
should address disputes over agency jurisdiction, particularly disputes in-
volving statutory silences.  The Supreme Court has yet to resolve wheth-
er Chevron deference should apply when an agency is interpreting the 
reach of its own jurisdiction,15 and academic opinion is similarly unset-
tled.16  However, principles drawn from the Court’s Chevron jurispru-
dence and familiar public-choice considerations both suggest that defe-
rence to agency determinations of their own authority should be 
disfavored—especially when an agency invokes a statutory silence as a 
basis for exercising jurisdiction.   
Part I explains that what are commonly, and simplistically, grouped 
together as “jurisdictional questions” actually come in a wide variety of 
different forms.  For example, agencies may assert jurisdiction or they 
may disclaim it.  A case might concern the existence of jurisdiction, the 
 
 12. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836–37 
(2001). 
 13. See id. at 836 (defining the “step zero” inquiry as “the inquiry that must be made in deciding 
whether courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Step Zero]. 
 14. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 833. 
 15. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The Supreme Court 
cannot be said to have resolved the issue definitively.”); Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a 
Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 812 n.151 (2007) (“The question of whether Chevron deference applies to the 
resolution of ‘jurisdictional’ issues has proved troublesome to courts.”); Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 12, at 844 (“The Court has never resolved whether there should be a ‘scope of jurisdiction’ excep-
tion to Chevron deference . . . .”).  But see, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 
487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 1 RICHARD PIERCE JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5, at 157–58 (4th ed. 2002) (suggesting the “pattern” of the 
Court’s decisions suggests “Chevron applies to cases in which an agency adopts a construction of a 
jurisdictional provision of a statute it administers”). 
 16. Compare, e.g., Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 234–36 (courts should apply Chevron to 
jurisdictional questions), and Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpre-
tations that Delimit the Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958 (1994) (same), 
with Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
989, 992–93 (1999) (Chevron is inapplicable to certain types of jurisdictional questions), and Merrill & 
Hickman, supra note 12, at 837 (same), and Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced 
Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1466–67 (2000) (same), and Torrey 
A. Cope, Note, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Jurisdiction After Mead, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1327 (2005) (same). 
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scope of jurisdiction, or the presence of a factual predicate necessary to 
trigger jurisdiction.  And an agency might interpret a statutory silence as 
a conferral (or, less often, a denial) of jurisdiction.  Part I then explores 
how courts have analyzed these different aspects of the jurisdiction prob-
lem, with a special focus on the question of statutory silences. 
Part II places this discussion in the broader context of the Chevron 
doctrine as explicated in subsequent cases.  As clarified by a near-
unanimous Court in Mead, agencies are entitled to deference when there 
is evidence that Congress has delegated them certain powers.  The issue 
of whether power has been conferred at all is thus antecedent to the issue 
of whether deference is appropriate; the second question arises only 
when the first question is answered in the affirmative. 
In Part III, we apply the presumption against deference to agency 
constructions of their own jurisdiction to the various categories identified 
in Part I.  In particular, courts should deny Chevron deference regardless 
of whether an agency is asserting or disclaiming jurisdiction.  This no-
deference rule should apply in both existence-of-power and scope-of-
power cases, partly because the line that distinguishes those two catego-
ries can be difficult to discern.  The one area where courts should grant 
deference (albeit not Chevron deference) is where agencies assert the ex-
istence of a factual predicate necessary to trigger jurisdiction.  As with 
other factual determinations agencies make in the course of administer-
ing legislatively authorized programs, such conclusions merit ample defe-
rence from the courts. 
Part IV offers a number of arguments in favor of our proposal.  The 
first set of arguments derives from familiar administrative law norms.  
Chevron itself implies that jurisdictional interpretations are not entitled 
to judicial deference (delegation is antecedent to deference), and the no-
deference rule likewise follows from the nature of administrative agen-
cies as creatures of statute that lack any inherent powers.  In addition, 
agencies are no more expert than courts are in resolving jurisdictional 
disputes, and the Administrative Procedure Act instructs that courts—
not agencies—are responsible for resolving issues of this sort.  Finally, 
our proposed no-deference rule is akin to a canon of avoidance that pre-
vents agencies from making jurisdictional claims that might implicate se-
paration-of-powers concerns. 
A second set of arguments is informed by public choice principles.  
Denying Chevron deference to agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations 
helps preserve the legislative “deal” that was struck within Congress.  A 
no-deference rule likewise creates desirable incentives for Congress to 
resolve a greater number of policy matters itself, leaving fewer to agen-
cies and the courts.  Finally, independent judicial resolution of agency ju-
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risdiction is necessary to guard against agency self-aggrandizement and 
self-interested behavior. 
Part V concludes by discussing potential objections to our proposal.  
The strongest counterargument is that a no-deference rule increases 
courts’ decision costs:  Courts cannot coherently draw a line that demar-
cates jurisdictional agency actions (which are eligible for Chevron defe-
rence) from nonjurisdictional ones (to which Chevron does not apply).  
While it may well be prohibitively difficult to say whether a particular 
agency action implicates the existence of a power or the scope of a power, 
in most cases the boundaries between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
actions will be less fuzzy, less frequent, and no more difficult than the 
sorts of question courts must answer all the time.  Another significant ob-
jection is that a decision whether or not to invoke agency jurisdiction in-
evitably involves policy determinations that should be left to accountable 
agency officials, not to unaccountable judges.  But this is question-
begging.  Agencies only have authority to make policy determinations if 
Congress has delegated them that power, and the issue in a jurisdictional 
case is precisely whether that delegation has taken place. 
I. DEFERENCE, JURISDICTION, AND STATUTORY SILENCES 
A. Analytical Categories 
Almost invariably, when courts (and academics) grapple with 
whether an agency’s views on the extent of its own powers should merit 
Chevron deference, they refer to such issues, without differentiation, as 
“jurisdictional.”17  In fact, these cases can be broken down into a number 
of analytically distinct categories.  Certain cases involve agency assertions 
of jurisdiction, while others present disclaimers of jurisdiction.  Some 
disputes concern the existence of agency jurisdiction, others the scope of 
jurisdiction.  Still others concern the presence (or lack) of a factual predi-
cate necessary to trigger agency jurisdiction.  A final type of case involves 
an agency interpreting a statutory silence—i.e., a statute’s failure to ex-
pressly grant or deny a proposed power—as a congressional conferral of 
jurisdiction.  In this Section we identify the various types of jurisdictional 
cases and discuss the unique concerns that each raises.  The lines dividing 
the various categories are not always perfectly clear, but we nevertheless 
attempt to draw them, both to improve analytical clarity and because we 
 
 17. But cf. Crawford, supra note 16, at 970 (recognizing that there are “two types of jurisdictional 
interpretations: those in which the agency is interpreting language directly entrusted to the agency and 
those assertions of authority that are not grounded in the statutory text”). 
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argue that whether deference is appropriate depends on the nature of the 
given jurisdictional dispute. 
The first category of jurisdictional questions concerns whether the 
agency’s interpretation expands or contracts its authority.  Most cases in-
volve an agency’s assertion of jurisdiction; that is, the agency interprets a 
statute as evincing Congress’s design to confer on it a particular power.18  
For instance, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) read the 
Paperwork Reduction Act to give it authority to review agency rules re-
quiring regulated entities to disclose information to third parties,19 and 
the U.S. Postal Service interpreted the Postal Reorganization Act to 
grant it the unilateral power to set rates for international mail service.20  
The danger posed by an agency’s jurisdiction-asserting interpretation is 
aggrandizement: the risk that the agency will exercise a power Congress 
did not intend for it to have, or that it will extend its power more broadly 
than Congress envisioned.21  Aggrandizement not only raises the risk that 
an agency might wield excessive power, but that it might disrupt Con-
gress’s intended distribution of power. 
In a smaller set of cases, an agency interprets a statute to disclaim 
jurisdiction; that is, the agency affirmatively renounces a power arguably 
granted to it, or concludes that an undisputedly granted power does not 
extend as far as it might.  For instance, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) concluded that it lacked authority to regulate broad-
band cable Internet service under Title II of the Communication Act.22  
The Federal Maritime Commission likewise interpreted the Maritime 
Labor Agreements Act to prevent it from considering labor policy when 
determining the validity of tariff rules.23  When interpreting the Migrato-
ry Bird Treaty Act, the Secretary of the Interior excluded mute swans 
from the bird species subject to the Act’s protection, thereby limiting his 
own regulatory authority.24  In perhaps the most famous, and controver-
sial, recent example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
claimed it lacked statutory authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse 
gases under the Clean Air Act.25 
 
 18. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 16, at 992 (“[E]xcept in highly unusual circumstances, 
agencies read their authority expansively and often pursue agendas far beyond that envisioned when 
the agencies were created.”). 
 19. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 34–36 (1990). 
 20. Air Courier Conference of Am., Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1223 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 21. See generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 203 (2004); see also infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
 22. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005). 
 23. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 24. Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 25. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511–12 (2007). 
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Jurisdiction-disclaiming interpretations pose the risk of abrogation: 
the possibility that an agency might fail to discharge the duty with which 
Congress has charged it, perhaps because of policy disagreements with 
the legislature or because it fears public disapproval for taking politically 
unpopular actions.  Even after the Supreme Court held that the EPA did 
in fact have authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air 
Act, the Bush Administration resisted exercising this authority.26  Presi-
dential administrations are not always eager to implement congressional 
commands. 
Abrogation is not the only risk.  Power-disclaiming interpretations 
sometimes pose a danger of agency aggrandizement, though of a differ-
ent sort.  Agencies might focus on matters that advance their own institu-
tional interests, as distinct from the interests Congress tasked them with 
serving.  Hence, they may resist devoting resources to projects they see 
as outside their core missions.  For years, J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI resisted 
efforts by Congress to give it responsibility for investigating narcotics of-
fenses and organized crime.27  Officials feared that the new responsibili-
ties would distract the Bureau from fulfilling its preferred mission—
solving kidnappings and bank robberies—and also might expose it to 
criticism for failing to fix the problems.28  The Army Corps of Engineers 
likewise resisted calls to regulate wetlands under the Clean Water Act, 
going so far as to deny that it had the statutory authority to regulate the 
filling of wetlands.29  Implementing a wetland permitting regime would 
require the Corps to develop a new regulatory focus, arguably at odds 
with its traditional development-oriented mission of maintaining the na-
vigability of waterways.  It took an adverse court ruling that the agency 
did in fact have authority before the Corps began regulating wetlands.30 
A second jurisdictional category concerns the quantity of power an 
agency claims.  The boldest assertions of jurisdiction appear in existence-
of-power cases, where an agency seeks to exercise a novel power unre-
lated to the authority with which Congress has entrusted it.  The agency 
does not just apply the authority the legislature undisputedly delegated 
it, but extends its jurisdiction “to a broad area of regulation, or to a large 
category of cases.”31  In effect, the agency creates a power for itself ex ni-
 
 26. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 
44,355 (proposed July 30, 2008). 
 27. RICHARD GID POWERS, BROKEN: THE TROUBLED PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE 
FBI 262 (2004). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,118, 12,119 
(Apr. 3, 1974). 
 30. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 31. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2100 
(1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration]. 
ADLER.DOCX 9/14/2009  1:36 PM 
No. 5] THE REST IS SILENCE 1505 
hilo (or categorically disclaims any power whatsoever).  A celebrated ex-
istence-of-power issue arose when the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), which was charged with adjudicating violations of 
federal commodities law, asserted its jurisdiction to resolve related state-
law issues as well.32  The Federal Election Commission (FEC) likewise 
asserted, out of whole cloth, the power to place in the public record con-
fidential information about an ongoing investigation.33 
Occupying the middle ground are scope-of-power cases, in which 
Congress has delegated an agency a certain quantity of authority but has 
left its magnitude and reach somewhat unclear.  In such cases, the agency 
interprets its grant of jurisdiction to entail another power, or to permit it 
to exercise its power in a particular way.  For instance, the Department 
of Health and Human Services cited its power under the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act to revise the “Vaccine Injury Table” as the ba-
sis for its claimed authority to change the definition of a disease listed in 
the Table.34  Similarly, the Interstate Commerce Commission concluded 
that its power to convert railroad right-of-ways into nature trails permit-
ted it to authorize only voluntary transfers between railroads and trail 
operators, not compelled ones.35  These cases may be the most difficult to 
identify; it can be particularly challenging to draw the line between ex-
panding the scope of an existing power and asserting an entirely new 
power. 
The least dramatic assertions occur in cases where an agency pro-
poses that the presence of a certain factual predicate triggers its dele-
gated jurisdiction.  In the typical factual-predicate case there is no dis-
pute as to whether Congress has delegated power to an agency; indeed, 
some factual-predicate cases do not involve interpretation of a statutory 
grant of power at all.  Rather, the question is whether a given set of facts 
necessary for the exercise of power exists.  For example, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) concluded that a quantity of 
natural gas was transported in interstate commerce, thus triggering its ju-
risdiction under the Natural Gas Act.36  The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission likewise asserted its jurisdiction over a freight company because 
it found that the company’s shipments were transported on public high-
ways.37  In these cases, Congress has identified the general conditions un-
der which the agency can exercise its regulatory authority, but has dele-
 
 32. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844–45 (1986). 
 33. In re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657, 662–63 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 34. O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 174–75 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 35. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 850 F.2d 694, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 36. Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 37. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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gated the agency responsibility for determining when the relevant condi-
tions are met. 
Any candid attempt to distinguish existence-of-power from scope-
of-power from factual-predicate cases must acknowledge that the boun-
daries between them are not always precisely demarcated.  For instance, 
OMB’s conclusion that it had the authority to review a Labor Depart-
ment regulation under the Paperwork Reduction Act could be described 
as an existence issue (asserting ex nihilo the power to review third-party 
disclosure rules) or a scope issue (asserting that the power to review in-
formation-gathering rules entails the power to review disclosure rules).  
Some suggest that this difficulty makes incoherent the enterprise of iden-
tifying a class of “jurisdictional” issues to which Chevron is inapplicable.38  
We discuss this problem at length below,39 but for now it is sufficient to 
note that (a) despite occasionally blurred lines, most jurisdictional cases 
can be assigned to one of these three categories quite comfortably; and 
(b) occasional difficulties in discerning boundaries does not, in itself, in-
validate the entire categorization enterprise.  We can still tell the time 
without identifying the precise moment at which day becomes dusk. 
A final category, which is a subset of jurisdiction-asserting cases, in-
volves statutory silences.  Statutory-silence cases present an evidentiary 
question:  How does one know whether Congress intended the agency to 
wield a particular power?  Is the fact that a statute is silent on the confer-
ral of a proposed power—i.e., the fact that the statute neither grants nor 
denies it—evidence that Congress anticipated that the agency would ex-
ercise that power?  Could it be evidence that Congress anticipated that 
the agency would not exercise it?  Or, as the FTC argued in the American 
Bar Ass’n case,40 is it somehow evidence that Congress delegated the ju-
risdictional decision to the agency? 
This issue arose when the National Mediation Board asserted its au-
thority sua sponte to investigate representation disputes among railway 
employees, based in large part on the failure of the Railway Labor Act to 
expressly deny that power.41  Similarly, the Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) located its authority to impose money damages against bus 
companies that failed to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) in the statute’s failure to expressly deny that power.42  In each 
case, the agency asserted that Congress’s failure to address the scope-of-
 
 38. See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Sca-
lia, J., concurring in the judgment); Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 
676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting); Crawford, supra note 16, at 968–69. 
 39. See infra Part V.A. 
 40. See supra text accompanying notes 1–10. 
 41. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 662. 
 42. Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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power question left the matter up to the agency within the bounds of 
Chevron step two. 
Statutory silences are vital to the analysis that follows and to our 
proposal to restrict the availability of judicial deference to agencies’ ju-
risdictional interpretations.  This is so because statutory silences vividly 
frame the central problem common to all jurisdiction cases:  What is the 
proper allocation of responsibility among Congress, agencies, and the 
courts for determining the scope of agency authority? 
B. Jurisdictional Questions in Court 
As more than one court of appeals has lamented, “[t]he Supreme 
Court cannot be said to have resolved the issue definitively” whether 
agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations are entitled to Chevron defe-
rence.43  While the Court on occasion has implied that an agency’s views 
on the scope of its jurisdiction command the judiciary’s deference, it also 
has implied the contrary.44  When the Court has addressed the issue, it 
has not been with a single voice.  And just as frequently, the Court has 
failed to speak at all, sidestepping obvious opportunities to illuminate the 
extent to which jurisdictional questions ought to be analyzed under the 
Chevron framework. 
The question received its fullest treatment in Justices Scalia and 
Brennan’s dueling opinions in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Missis-
sippi ex rel. Moore.45  That case upheld the FERC’s jurisdiction to require 
that a Mississippi utility company purchase power from a nuclear plant, 
thereby preempting a state agency from determining whether those costs 
were prudently incurred.46  Justice Stevens’s majority opinion did so, 
however, without addressing the deference question.  It did not so much 
as cite Chevron. 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that “the rule of de-
ference applies even to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory au-
thority or jurisdiction.”47  He identified three reasons.  First, Justice Sca-
 
 43. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 
F.3d 170, 176 n.6 (1st Cir. 1996); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 911 F.2d 993, 
1002 (5th Cir. 1990); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 835. 
 44. Compare Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986) (stating 
that “considerable weight must be accorded the CFTC’s position” that “it has the power to take juris-
diction over [state-law] counterclaims” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984))), with Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (recognizing 
that “agency determinations within the scope of delegated authority are entitled to deference,” but 
reiterating the “fundamental” principle “‘that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which 
it has no jurisdiction’” (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973))). 
 45. 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
 46. Id. at 369–70. 
 47. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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lia denied “that agencies can claim no special expertise in interpreting 
their authorizing statutes if an issue can be characterized as jurisdiction-
al.”48  The implication is that agencies are experts in determining whether 
they have jurisdiction, if for no other reason than they are expert in the 
general subject matter of their regulatory authority.  This is a plausible 
argument, since agencies are sometimes responsible for drafting and 
pressing the legislative proposals they are later charged to implement; 
that in turn suggests agencies know what at least some statutes were in-
tended to authorize and accomplish.  Second, Justice Scalia argued that 
Congress “would naturally expect” agencies to determine whether an 
ambiguous statute grants them jurisdiction.49  In other words, courts 
should presume Congress has delegated agencies the power to resolve 
jurisdictional ambiguities.  These two reasons—agency expertise and the 
presumption of congressional delegation—are of course consistent with 
various commonly accepted rationales for Chevron deference.50 
By far the most important (and most frequently echoed) of Justice 
Scalia’s objections is a prudentialist one: courts’ asserted inability to dis-
tinguish jurisdictional issues from nonjurisdictional issues.51  “[T]here is 
no discernable line,” he argued, “between an agency’s exceeding its au-
thority and an agency’s exceeding authorized application of its authori-
ty.”52  Instead, one can describe a given question alternately as “jurisdic-
tional” or “nonjurisdictional” simply by manipulating the level of 
generality at which one poses it.53 
Justice Scalia’s claim hangs by an empirical thread: the proposition 
that it is impossible (or prohibitively difficult) to identify a jurisdictional 
question as jurisdictional.  There is nothing intrinsically wrong, so the ar-
gument seems to go, with courts resolving jurisdictional matters de novo; 
it just so happens that they cannot recognize a jurisdictional matter when 
it comes before them.  As a consequence, courts will have a difficult time 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 381–82. 
 50. See id. at 381 (identifying Congress’s expectation as “the general rationale for deference”); 
see also, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that an agency inter-
pretation “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law”); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 
496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990) (“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind 
Chevron deference.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1284 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (stressing “the difficulties of drawing a manageable and principled line between juris-
dictional and other issues”); Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 676–77 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, any issue may readily be characterized 
as jurisdictional merely by manipulating the level of generality at which it is framed.”); Sunstein, Law 
and Administration, supra note 31, at 2097 n.124, 2099 nn.132–33; Crawford, supra note 16, at 968–69. 
 52. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. (“Virtually any administrative action can be characterized as either the one or the other, 
depending upon how generally one wishes to describe the ‘authority.’”). 
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confining themselves to truly jurisdictional questions.  It is inevitable that 
reviewing courts will stray into the substance of the agency action, there-
by intruding on areas that, for Justice Scalia, should be the exclusive do-
main of politically accountable agencies.  If courts had that capacity to 
recognize jurisdictional disputes, Justice Scalia’s objection would be less 
weighty. 
Although his Mississippi Power & Light concurrence does not flesh 
out the argument, Justice Scalia’s concern appears to be with ensuring 
that courts decide cases according to principled, non-arbitrary standards 
and that judges avoid the policymaking that resolving statutory ambigui-
ties may entail.54  A related idea animates his opinion for the Court in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,55 where he argued that, when considering 
whether a claimed right is in fact protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause, a court should describe that right at the most 
specific level of generality.56  Allowing courts to play fast and loose with 
the level of abstraction “ha[s] the virtue (if it be that) of leaving judges 
free to decide as they think best” and indeed “permit[s] judges to dictate 
rather than discern the society’s views.”57  Instead, “if arbitrary decision 
making is to be avoided,” courts must be constrained “to adopt the most 
specific tradition as the point of reference.”58  No less in the context of 
agency powers, courts’ ability to manipulate the generality at which they 
frame a jurisdictional question poses the risk that they will do so in a way 
that enables them to reach a desired result.59 
Dissenting from his colleagues’ conclusion that FERC had jurisdic-
tion, Justice Brennan took special exception to Justice Scalia’s reasons 
for extending Chevron deference to jurisdictional questions.  Justice 
Brennan did not dispute his rival on all fronts, but rather advanced a 
more modest proposition.  He argued not that Chevron is categorically 
inapplicable to jurisdictional disputes, but only that courts should not de-
fer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that “is designed to confine 
the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to 
 
 54. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186–87 
(1989). 
 55. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 56. Id. at 111, 127 n.6. 
 57. Id. at 127 n.6. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Whatever its basis, Justice Scalia’s concern with judicially manageable line-drawing, particu-
larly in the Chevron context, is an oft-repeated one.  Notably, it informed his lone dissent in United 
States v. Mead, in which the Court declined to afford Chevron deference to Customs Service tariff de-
signations that were made in a fairly informal manner.  533 U.S. 218, 258 n.6 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“The authoritativeness of the agency ruling may not be a bright-line standard—but it is infinitely 
brighter than the line the Court asks us to draw today . . . .”); see also id. at 236 (majority opinion) 
(“Justice Scalia’s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify.”). 
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occupy.”60  Justice Brennan’s dissent leaves untouched the question 
whether Chevron ought to apply to jurisdictional questions that do not 
involve statutes specifically enacted to restrict agency authority.  It fur-
ther raises the question whether any statute that enumerates limited reg-
ulatory jurisdiction can be said to “restrict” agency authority. 
Justice Brennan’s reasons for denying Chevron deference to juris-
diction-curtailing statutes speak with broader force and counsel against 
deferring to any agency jurisdictional interpretation.  First, deference 
poses an unacceptable risk of agency aggrandizement:  Congress’s evi-
dent policy “in favor of limiting the agency’s jurisdiction” might be fru-
strated by “the agency’s institutional interests in expanding its own pow-
er.”61  Second, and contra Scalia, “agencies can claim no special expertise 
in interpreting a statute confining its jurisdiction.”62   
Justice Brennan’s third and most powerful concern derives from the 
nature of administrative agencies:  “Agencies do not ‘administer’ statutes 
confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and such statutes are not ‘en-
trusted’ to agencies.”63  In other words, Chevron deference only applies 
when an agency is tasked with administering the statute in question, be-
cause only then can it be presumed that Congress delegated the relevant 
authority.  Just as the FERC would not be entitled to deference for its 
interpretations of the Clean Water Act (since that statute is administered 
by the EPA),64 neither would it receive deference when issuing a jurisdic-
tional interpretation (since the agency does not administer such matters).  
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Brennan adopts a presumption about Con-
gress’s likely intent:  “[W]e cannot presume that Congress implicitly in-
tended an agency to fill ‘gaps’ in a statute confining the agency’s jurisdic-
tion . . . .”65  Justice Brennan’s dissent thus anticipates the Mead Court’s 
subsequent clarification that the Chevron regime is based on a presump-
tion about Congress’s intent to delegate interpretive and policymaking 
powers to agencies.66 
 
 60. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 387. 
 62. Id.  Neither opinion musters any evidence for, and does no more than baldly assert, its claim 
about agency expertise. 
 63. Id. at 386–87. 
 64. See Ala. Rivers Alliance v. FERC, 325 F.3d 290, 297 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (indicating that the 
court will not defer to FERC’s interpretation of CWA because “it is EPA—and not FERC—that ad-
ministers the CWA”). 
 65. Id. at 387. 
 66. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (concluding that Chevron deference 
applies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules car-
rying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority”); see also infra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
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Justices Scalia and Brennan’s Mississippi Power & Light schism is 
not developed in later cases.  But the competing considerations their 
opinions sounded—difficulty of identifying jurisdictional questions vs. 
risk of aggrandizement, presence vs. absence of expertise, presumed del-
egation vs. presumed denial of authority—have since been echoed by 
those grappling with the issue. 
One of the best-known discussions appears in CFTC v. Schor,67 
which antedates Mississippi Power & Light by two years.  Pro-deference 
courts and commentators often invoke Schor as an example of the Su-
preme Court’s willingness to defer to agency views on the extent of their 
own jurisdiction.  Indeed, Justice Scalia’s Mississippi Power & Light con-
currence cited it for the proposition that an agency’s entitlement to such 
deference is “settled law.”68  A close reading, however, reveals that Schor 
stands for no such thing. 
Schor is a pure existence-of-power case.  The issue was whether the 
CFTC, which had the undisputed power to adjudicate violations of the 
Commodities Exchange Act, rightly interpreted that statute as granting 
the CFTC jurisdiction over related state-law counterclaims.  The Court 
held that it did.69  Although the Schor Court upheld the CFTC’s assertion 
of jurisdiction, it did so without deferring to the agency’s interpretation.  
Rather, it decided the issue de novo, time and again mustering evidence 
to support its conclusion that the Act unambiguously evinced Congress’s 
design to grant the Commission authority over state-law counterclaims.  
The Court specifically found that “Congress plainly intended the CFTC 
to decide counterclaims”;70 Congress’s intent was “evident on the face of 
the statute”;71 the legislative history “unambiguously demonstrates 
that . . . Congress intended to vest in the CFTC the power to define the 
scope of the counterclaims”;72 the statute “clearly authorizes . . . adjudica-
tion of common law counterclaims”;73 and “abundant evidence” revealed 
Congress’s intent that the CFTC hear state-law counterclaims.74  This is 
not the language of deference. 
 
 67. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 68. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g., 
Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Air 
Courier Conference of Am., Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1223–24 & n.8 (3d Cir. 
1992); Crawford, supra note 16, at 961–62. 
 69. Schor, 478 U.S. at 835–36, 847.  After resolving the statutory question, the Court then consi-
dered whether the CFTC’s assertion of jurisdiction—or Congress’s delegation of that power—
offended Article III of the Constitution.  Id. at 847–58.  This latter question is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 70. Id. at 841. 
 71. Id. at 841–42. 
 72. Id. at 842. 
 73. Id. at 843. 
 74. Id. at 847. 
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Of course, Schor cited Chevron for the proposition that “considera-
ble weight must be accorded the CFTC’s position.”75  The Court ex-
plained that such deference was due in part because of the CFTC’s ex-
pertise:  “An agency’s expertise is superior to that of a court when a 
dispute centers on whether a particular regulation is ‘reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the pur-
poses’ of the Act the agency is charged with enforcing . . . .”76  But this 
discussion comes on the heels of the Court’s holding that the Act unam-
biguously granted the CFTC jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims.  
There was no need to defer to the CFTC’s “reasonable interpretation” 
because Congress had settled the matter itself.  The Schor Court’s feint 
toward extending Chevron to jurisdictional questions is therefore dicta.77 
The Supreme Court upheld the CFTC’s assertion of authority in 
Schor, but it also has invalidated agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations.  
In Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, the Court struck down the 
OMB’s assertion of jurisdiction, under the Paperwork Reduction Act, to 
review the Labor Department’s “hazard communication standard.”78  
That regulation required manufacturers to disclose information about 
hazardous workplace chemicals directly to their employees, rather than 
to the government.79  It was undisputed that the OMB had jurisdiction to 
review “information-gathering rules”—i.e., rules requiring regulated ent-
 
 75. Id. at 844. 
 76. Id. at 845. 
 77. This is a common strategy, not just at the Supreme Court, but among the lower courts as 
well: Courts regularly conclude that an agency’s jurisdictional interpretation is or is not eligible for 
Chevron deference after finding that the relevant statute unambiguously settles the issue.  In effect, 
courts discuss the possibility of deferring to an agency’s views only after deciding, de novo, whether 
those views are meritorious.  For instance, in evaluating the Postal Service’s assertion of authority to 
set international mail rates, a court concluded that Congress unambiguously delegated that power, and 
went on to state that its holding was “buttressed” and “strengthened” by the deference to which the 
agency was entitled.  Air Courier Conference of Am., Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 
1215, 1217–23 (3d Cir. 1992).  Another court held that an act of Congress “strongly, if not conclusive-
ly” evinced the legislature’s design to grant the Interior Department authority to take certain lands 
into trust for Indian tribes, and went on to extend the agency’s interpretation Chevron deference—
“[i]nsofar as agency deference remains appropriate in this case.”  Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2000).  The same pattern holds true for courts 
declining to defer to an agency’s assertion of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Surface 
Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the Board unambiguously had jurisdic-
tion over a set of railroad track, but stating that “an agency’s determination about the scope of its own 
jurisdiction indeed does receive de novo review and not Chevron deference”); United Transp. Union, 
169 F.3d at 477 (taking the same approach).  This approach is consistent both with Chevron, see Craw-
ford, supra note 16, at 965, and with the proposition that Chevron is inapplicable to jurisdictional ques-
tions.  When courts conclude that a given statute unambiguously grants or denies an agency a pro-
posed power, they are deciding, consistent with Chevron step one, that Congress’s intent is clear.  But 
they are also engaging in the sort of de novo analysis they would be obliged to undertake if Chevron 
deference were unavailable.  Hence, the fact that a court strikes an agency’s assertion of jurisdiction 
on the grounds that Congress unambiguously foreclosed it should not be seen as a tacit holding that 
Chevron applies to jurisdictional questions. 
 78. 494 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1990). 
 79. See id. at 28–29 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1984)). 
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ities to collect data and submit it to the agency.  What was uncertain was 
whether the Act authorized the OMB to review “disclosure rules”—i.e., 
rules requiring regulated entities to collect data and make it available, 
not to the agency, but to third parties. 
The Court recognized that the Paperwork Reduction Act did not 
expressly deny the OMB the power to review disclosure rules.80  But it 
nevertheless held that the agency lacked jurisdiction since “the statute, as 
a whole, clearly expresses Congress’ intention” to deny the OMB such 
authority.81  As in Schor, the Court found Chevron inapplicable and de-
clined to consult the agency’s views.  Justice White, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the majority improperly withheld 
Chevron deference from the OMB’s interpretation.82  Justice White also 
approvingly cited Justice Scalia’s Mississippi Power & Light concurrence 
to disparage the assertion that “Chevron should not apply” to agency 
regulations that “determine the scope of its jurisdiction.”83 
On its face, Dole appears to present an existence-of-power question:  
Does the OMB have authority to review disclosure rules?  But, perhaps 
illustrating Justice Scalia’s concern about manipulating the level of gene-
rality, the OMB cast the issue as concerning the scope of its jurisdiction.  
The OMB argued that it had the authority to review disclosure rules 
since they are a specific type of information-gathering rule.84  As the 
OMB saw things, it undisputedly held power X; it asserted power Y; the 
issue was whether power Y was no more than an application of power X.  
Ultimately, the possible distinction in Dole between the existence of a 
power and its scope was irrelevant, since the Court concluded that the 
Paperwork Reduction Act unambiguously denied the agency that power. 
A particularly noteworthy example of the Supreme Court invalidat-
ing an agency’s jurisdictional interpretation is FDA v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., a scope-of-power case in which the FDA argued that 
its power under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to regulate 
“drugs” and “devices” entailed the power to regulate tobacco products.85  
The FDCA defines “drug” to include “articles (other than food) in-
tended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”86  Pointing to 
 
 80. Id. at 34. 
 81. Id. at 42–43 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984)); see also Dole, 494 U.S. at 35 (explaining that “the language, structure, and purpose of 
the Paperwork Reduction Act reveal that . . . Congress did not intend the Act to encompass these or 
any other third-party disclosure rules”). 
 82. Dole, 494 U.S. at 53 (White, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 54.  Justice Scalia joined the Dole majority, presumably on the Chevron step one 
ground that the statute unambiguously foreclosed OMB jurisdiction.  See id. at 27, 42–43 (Scalia, J.). 
 84. Id. at 34–35. 
 85. 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
 86. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006). 
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its obvious pharmacological effects on the body, the FDA determined 
that nicotine is a “drug” and that tobacco products are delivery “devic-
es,” and it promulgated a rule restricting the sale of tobacco to children 
and adolescents.87 
A sharply divided Supreme Court struck down the agency’s asser-
tion of jurisdiction, concluding, at Chevron step one, that Congress un-
ambiguously meant to exclude tobacco from the FDA’s purview.88  The 
legislature had revealed that intent in two ways.  First, it undeniably 
meant for the sale of tobacco to remain legal.  But if the FDA were to 
regulate tobacco products, it would have to ban them.89  This is so be-
cause the FDCA requires that a regulated product be deemed “safe” and 
“effective” for its intended use, and the agency has consistently main-
tained that tobacco products are unsafe, indeed deadly.90  Second, Con-
gress enacted a number of tobacco-specific statutes since 1965, creating a 
distinct regulatory scheme and effectively “ratif[ying] the FDA’s long-
held position that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate tobac-
co products.”91 
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that a literal reading of the 
FDCA’s text, its purpose, and its legislative history all pointed in favor of 
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products.92  He also disputed the majori-
ty’s conclusions that, were the FDA to regulate tobacco products, it 
would have no alternative but to ban them as not “safe,” and that Con-
gress’s tobacco legislation reflected its intent to deny jurisdiction to the 
FDA.93  According to Justice Breyer, the FDCA grants the FDA wide la-
titude on how to protect consumers from unsafe products; an outright 
ban would not be required.94  Moreover, Congress’s enactment of tobac-
co-specific laws does not demonstrate that it meant to deny the FDA ju-
risdiction over tobacco; such laws are perfectly consistent with an intent 
to allow the FDA to regulate with whatever authority it might otherwise 
hold.95 
It would be difficult to imagine a case that more clearly presented 
the question whether Chevron applies to agencies’ jurisdictional interpre-
tations.  Indeed, several amici urged the Court to hold that an agency’s 
 
 87. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125. 
 88. See id. at 159–60. 
 89. Id. at 137. 
 90. Id. at 136. 
 91. Id. at 144. 
 92. Id. at 161–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 174–87. 
 94. Id. at 174–81. 
 95. Id. at 181–86. 
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assertion of jurisdiction is not eligible for deference.96  Yet the Court 
punted—neither majority nor dissent grappled with the question.  With-
out so much as acknowledging the issue, let alone providing a reason, the 
majority simply announced that Chevron was the appropriate frame-
work.97  At the same time, the Court signaled that the scope of the Che-
vron inquiry in a given case, as distinguished from whether Chevron ap-
plies at all, depends upon “the nature of the question presented.”98  The 
majority stopped short of holding that Chevron is inapplicable to certain 
disputes, but it implied that courts should be quick to find a clearly ex-
pressed congressional intent in “extraordinary cases,” such as when an 
agency asserts regulatory jurisdiction of unprecedented scope.99  In effect, 
the Court puts a finger on the scale so that an otherwise comparatively 
vague statute may be read as though its meaning were clear. 
The Court was confronted with additional opportunities to weigh in 
on the applicability of Chevron to jurisdictional questions in National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,100 and 
again in Massachusetts v. EPA.101  As in Brown & Williamson, both cases 
involved scope-of-power disputes.  The wrinkle is that Brand X and Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA are rare examples of agencies disclaiming powers ar-
guably conferred on them by Congress. 
Brand X concerned Title II of the Communications Act, which 
grants the FCC authority to regulate entities that offer “telecommunica-
tions service.”102  Among other requirements, these regulated carriers 
must charge rates that are just and reasonable, allow other carriers to in-
terconnect with their networks, and make payments to the federal uni-
versal service fund.103  The FCC concluded that broadband Internet ser-
vices offered by cable companies were not “telecommunications service” 
within the meaning of the Act.104  In other words, the FCC reasoned that 
the scope of its undisputed power to regulate providers of “telecommu-
 
 96. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152), 1999 WL 712594, at *16–20; 
Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152), 1999 WL 712593, at *13–17. 
 97. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132 (remarking that the Court’s analysis is governed by 
Chevron since the case “involves an administrative agency’s construction of a statute that it adminis-
ters”). 
 98. Id. at 159. 
 99. Id. (“[T]here may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such 
an implicit delegation.”). 
 100. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 101. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 102. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2006). 
 103. Id. §§ 201, 251(a)(1), 254(d). 
 104. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4823–24 (2002). 
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nications service” did not extend to the broadband services offered by 
cable companies. 
Five years after Brown & Williamson, the Court was handed anoth-
er chance to offer guidance on whether and why Chevron might or might 
not apply to jurisdictional questions.  Yet the analysis was equally unsa-
tisfactory.  The Court announced that Chevron was the appropriate 
framework, determined that the Communication Act’s reference to “tel-
ecommunications service” was ambiguous, and concluded that the FCC 
reasonably interpreted that term to exclude broadband offered by cable 
companies.105  To its credit, the Brand X Court did undertake a “step ze-
ro” inquiry:  It considered whether Chevron deference is appropriate 
notwithstanding that the FCC’s deregulatory approach to cable compa-
nies represented a reversal of past agency practice, and that the FCC’s 
interpretation of “telecommunications service” was inconsistent with 
prior Ninth Circuit precedent.106  But the Court missed the most obvious 
“step zero” inquiry of all.  It simply declared that “[t]he Chevron frame-
work governs our review of the Commission’s construction”107 without 
even noticing the jurisdiction issue. 
Like the majority, Justice Scalia’s Brand X dissent sidesteps the ju-
risdiction question, and goes on to argue that cable companies’ broad-
band services are unambiguously “telecommunications service[s]” within 
the meaning of the Act.108  Yet his opinion still comes as something of a 
surprise.  Two decades earlier, while a law professor, he penned an ano-
nymous article in the journal Regulation criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration im-
properly rescinded a requirement that automobile manufacturers equip 
their cars with air bags or automatic seat belts.109  According to Professor 
Scalia, courts should apply a more relaxed version of arbitrary and capri-
cious review to agencies’ deregulatory initiatives than to regulatory initia-
tives: 
Granted that a rulemaking proceeding must be conducted to im-
pose regulation and to eliminate regulation alike, it does not neces-
sarily follow that in both types of proceeding the burden of justifica-
tion rests on the proponent of change.  As far as the substantive 
inertia of our laws is concerned, that favors not the status quo but 
private autonomy, whether or not that be what the status quo pre-
 
 105. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986–1000. 
 106. Id. at 980–86.  Citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), the Court concluded that deference was in order.  Brand X, 545 
U.S. at 980–81. 
 107. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980. 
 108. Id. at 1006–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 109. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 
vacated sub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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scribes.  That is to say, private freedom can neither be constrained 
nor continue to be constrained without good reason.110 
One might have predicted that Justice Scalia would want to facili-
tate agency deregulation under Chevron in the same way that Professor 
Scalia wanted to facilitate it under the Administrative Procedures Act’s 
arbitrary and capricious standard.  In other words, for Justice Scalia, 
agency efforts to disclaim jurisdiction might not just be eligible for Che-
vron deference, but might qualify for even more relaxed judicial scrutiny 
under Chevron.  Yet Justice Scalia’s Brand X dissent derides “the Com-
mission’s self-congratulatory paean to its deregulatory largesse,”111 and 
instead applies the Chevron analysis at full strength. 
The Court’s most recent foray into questions of agency jurisdiction 
came in Massachusetts v. EPA.112  In 2003, the EPA concluded it lacked 
jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse gases as “air pollutants” under the 
Clean Air Act.113  According to the EPA, the statute simply did not con-
fer such authority.114  A 5-4 majority rejected the agency’s claim, ruling 
that the Act’s “sweeping definition” of “air pollutant”—“any air pollu-
tion agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemi-
cal . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the 
ambient air”115—was broad enough to embrace “[c]arbon dioxide, me-
thane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.”116  As in Brown & Wil-
liamson, the Court did not consider whether Chevron deference should 
apply to the EPA’s opinion that it lacked jurisdiction; perhaps the reason 
it failed to do was its conclusion that the plain language of the Clean Air 
Act “without a doubt” and “unambiguous[ly]” conferred such authority 
on the agency.117  The Court did manage to cite Chevron, but only for the 
boilerplate proposition that “an agency has broad discretion to choose 
how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its 
delegated responsibilities.”118 
 
 110. Active Judges and Passive Restraints, REGULATION, July–Aug. 1982, at 10, 13. 
 111. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1013 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1005 (“[I]t might be more 
accurate to say the Commission has attempted to establish a whole new regime of non-
regulation . . . .”). 
 112. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 113. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
 114. See id. at 52,925–29.  It should be noted that one of the authors participated in an amicus cu-
riae brief taking this position as well.  See Brief for The Cato Institute and Law Professors Jonathan H. 
Adler, James L. Huffman, and Andrew P. Morriss as Amici Curiae in Supporting Respondents, Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3043962, at *20. 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). 
 116. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 527. 
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Given the Supreme Court’s mixed messages, it is not surprising that 
the lower courts are uncertain whether to extend Chevron deference to 
agencies’ interpretations of their own jurisdiction.  In all, four courts of 
appeals have concluded that Chevron is fully applicable to jurisdictional 
interpretations: the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.119  The 
Federal and Seventh Circuits have declined to extend Chevron defe-
rence.120  The D.C. and Eighth Circuits appear to have resolved the issue 
both ways.  After initially signaling that Chevron is inapplicable to juris-
dictional questions, the courts have shown their willingness to extend de-
ference in more recent cases.121  The question remains unresolved in the 
remaining circuits.122 
C. Statutory Silences 
While the Chevron Court squarely held that statutory silences can 
be deference-triggering ambiguities,123 it has been opaque on whether 
that rule applies with equal force in all contexts.  Hornbook administra-
tive law teaches that an agency deserves deference when interpreting a 
statute’s silence on the manner in which an undisputedly delegated pow-
er is to be exercised.124  But few courts—the Supreme Court included—
have considered whether Chevron applies to a statute’s silence on the ex-
istence or scope of a claimed administrative power.  Those that have 
weighed the issue generally have held that Congress’s failure to expressly 
deny a power to an agency is not an ambiguity on whether that power 
has been delegated. 
 
 119. See Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 93 (2d Cir. 2000); Air Courier 
Conference of Am., Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1223–25 (3d Cir. 1992); Transpa-
cific Westbound Rate Agreement v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 951 F.2d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 1991); Bd. of Gov-
ernors of the Univ. of N.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 917 F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 120. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 2009 WL 1916498 (Fed. 
Cir. July 6, 2009); N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2002); Unit-
ed Transp. Union v. Surface Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 121. Compare N.Y. Shipping Ass’n v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1362–63 (D.C. Cir. 
1988), and ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam), with Conn. Dep’t of 
Pub. Util. Control v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 07-1375, 2009 WL 1754607 (D.C. Cir. June 
23, 2009); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 475 F.3d 1277, 
1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1281, 
1283–84 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990); compare 
Lyon County Landfill v. EPA, 406 F.3d 981, 983–84 (8th Cir. 2005), with Missouri v. Andrews, 787 
F.2d 270, 286 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 122. See Bush & Burchett, Inc. v. Reich, 117 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir. 1997); O’Connell v. Shalala, 
79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996); Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 955 F.2d 
1412, 1415 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 911 F.2d 993, 
1002 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 997–98 (11th Cir. 1996); id. at 999 (Carnes, 
J., concurring) (declining to join the portion of the majority opinion that discusses “the deference that 
might be due the Commission’s regulations and advisory opinions”). 
 123. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (concluding 
that deference is due “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue”). 
 124. 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 143. 
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The most recent judicial treatment of statutory silences comes in 
American Bar Ass’n v. FTC,125 but the question was most fully explored 
in the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n 
v. National Mediation Board.126  The Railway Labor Act grants the Na-
tional Mediation Board power to investigate representation disputes 
among railway employees “upon request of either party to the dis-
pute,”127 but the Board asserted the power to initiate such investigations 
sua sponte.  The Board’s principal basis for its claimed authority was the 
failure of the Railway Labor Act to expressly deny it that power.128 
A divided court invalidated the Board’s interpretation, finding “in-
credible” the suggestion that “the Board has the power to do whatever it 
pleases merely by virtue of its existence.”129  On the contrary, agencies 
have no intrinsic authority and wield only the powers that the legislature 
delegates them.130  The court expressly declined to apply Chevron to the 
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction.  Deference is called for only where a 
statute’s meaning is ambiguous, and the Railway Labor Act’s silence on 
the extent of the Board’s power was “no ambiguity.”131  Instead, the court 
surveyed de novo the statute’s text and legislative history to reach the 
“inescapable conclusion” that Congress never meant for the Board to in-
vestigate representation disputes sua sponte.132  Then the court delivered 
the coup de grace: 
To suggest, as the Board effectively does, that Chevron step two is 
implicated any time a statute does not expressly negate the exis-
tence of a claimed administrative power (i.e. when the statute is not 
written in “thou shalt not” terms), is both flatly unfaithful to the 
principles of administrative law outlined above, and refuted by 
precedent.  Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an 
express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually 
limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron 
and quite likely with the Constitution as well.133 
 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 1–10. 
 126. 29 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also In re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(holding that, because the Federal Election Campaign Act nowhere authorized the Federal Election 
Commission to “make public an ongoing investigation,” the statute’s “clear meaning” denied it that 
power); Lancashire Coal Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 968 F.2d 388, 390–91 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding “consider-
able support” for the proposition that the Mine Safety and Health Act’s failure to grant the agency 
authority over structures “resulting from” the mining of coal was a denial of power). 
 127. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). 
 128. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 659 (“[T]he Board would have us presume a delega-
tion of power from Congress absent an express withholding of such power.”); id. at 661. 
 129. Id. at 659. 
 130. Id. at 670. 
 131. Id. at 664 n.5; see also id. at 671. 
 132. Id. at 664–69. 
 133. Id. at 671 (citations omitted). 
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Several features of the D.C. Circuit’s decision merit attention.  First, 
the majority’s holding turned on its view that all agency power derives 
from congressional delegation.  Second, the court held that the Board’s 
jurisdictional interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference after 
concluding, de novo, that the Railway Labor Act unambiguously ans-
wered the question.  Third, the D.C. Circuit suggested not only that Con-
gress had not delegated to the Board the power to define its own jurisdic-
tion, but also that it could not.  The source of that impediment was “the 
Constitution,” presumably in the form of a judicially enforceable nonde-
legation doctrine.134 
Judge Williams’s dissent did not engage the majority’s specific hold-
ing that a statutory silence is not an ambiguity on whether Congress has 
conveyed a proposed a power.  Instead, he made the more general claim 
that agencies are entitled to Chevron deference on all jurisdictional ques-
tions.135  His principal reason, echoing Justice Scalia,136 is the impossibility 
of identifying a jurisdictional matter as jurisdictional:  Courts cannot 
draw “a manageable line between jurisdictional and other issues” since 
“any issue may readily be characterized as jurisdictional merely by mani-
pulating the level of generality at which it is framed.”137  Judge Williams 
conceded that courts have the capacity to distinguish jurisdictional ques-
tions from nonjurisdictional ones when the powers of the judiciary are at 
issue.138  But “the categorization” of such cases “is typically self-evident” 
because the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions expressly de-
fine themselves as jurisdictional.139 
Despite the apparent en banc resolution of this question, a D.C. 
Circuit panel blinked at the issue when it was presented again in Ameri-
can Bus Ass’n v. Slater.140  Here, the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) asserted the authority to impose money damages on bus compa-
nies that failed to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).141  The ADA provides that a violation of its guarantees is to be 
cured by the same remedies authorized by parts of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act,142 and those parts do not permit plaintiffs to recover damages.143  The 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 676–77 (Williams, J. dissenting). 
 136. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]here is no discernible line between an agency’s exceeding its authority and an agen-
cy’s exceeding authorized application of its authority.”). 
 137. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 676 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 231 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 141. Id. at 2. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2006). 
 143. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
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statute is wholly silent on agencies’ authority to supplement the enume-
rated remedies with ones of their own devising.  The DOT argued, and 
the district court held, that the ADA’s failure to expressly foreclose the 
possibility of money damages was an ambiguity on the agency’s authority 
to impose them.144 
In an opinion by Judge Sentelle, the court struck down the agency’s 
rule on the grounds that Congress unambiguously meant to preclude the 
DOT from authorizing money damages.145  The panel did not engage the 
DOT’s statutory-silence argument, but the question receives extensive 
treatment in Judge Sentelle’s concurrence to his own majority opinion.  
According to Judge Sentelle, Chevron “is not even implicated in this 
case.”146  This is because statutory silences, at least for jurisdictional ques-
tions, are not deference-triggering ambiguities.147  In other words, the 
ADA “is not ambiguous on whether it grants DOT the power to author-
ize money damages against non-complying bus companies.  The statute 
simply does not grant it that power.”148 
Judge Sentelle derided the DOT’s position—“that that which is not 
forbidden is permitted”—as contrary to the nature of administrative 
agencies.149  “Agencies have no inherent powers.”150  “They . . . are crea-
tures of statute . . . [that] may act only because, and only to the extent 
that, Congress affirmatively has delegated them the power to act.”151  
Judge Sentelle concluded by drawing an analogy between the powers of 
administrative agencies and those of the federal government.  In the 
same way that the “Constitution permits the national government to ex-
ercise only those powers affirmatively granted to it by the people of the 
several states,” an agency lacks the power to act unless Congress has con-
ferred authority on it.152 
 
 144. See Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 17 NDLR ¶ 166 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
986849, at *22 (“The plain language indicates that Congress did not explicitly forbid the Secretary 
from including a compensation mechanism in the [bus] accessibility regulations.”). 
 145. Am. Bus, 231 F.3d at 4 (“By preceding the words ‘remedies and procedures’ with the definite 
article ‘the,’ as opposed to the more general ‘a’ or ‘an,’ Congress made clear that it understood [the 
enumerated] remedies to be exclusive.”). 
 146. Id. at 8 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. (“Congress’s failure to grant an agency a given power is not an ambiguity as to whether 
that power has, in fact, been granted.  On the contrary, and as this Court persistently has recognized, a 
statutory silence on the granting of a power is a denial of that power to the agency.”). 
 148. Id. at 9; see also NRA v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(“The statute is not ambiguous on whether it grants the Attorney General the power to retain the 
records which the statute empowers her to destroy. The statute simply does not grant her that pow-
er.”). 
 149. Am. Bus, 231 F.3d at 9 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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II. MEAD AND THE MEANING OF CHEVRON 
The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc.153 did not purport to be a land-
mark holding, nor was it universally recognized as one when first handed 
down.154  The Justices saw the case as involving fairly routine, albeit 
somewhat technical, questions of environmental law and regulatory ap-
plication.155  Relatively quickly, however, the decision was recognized as 
a canonical statement on how federal courts should interact with federal 
agencies on questions of statutory interpretation.156  Since 1984, “the de-
cision has become a foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text . . . .”157  
Yet Chevron did not resolve all debates about when and how courts 
should defer to agency statutory interpretations.  In the years since, there 
has been “a doctrinal tug of war within the Supreme Court” and in the 
pages of law reviews over how broadly the Court’s Chevron rule should 
be applied.158  Whether to extend Chevron deference to agency interpre-
tations of jurisdictional provisions is one of the contested realms within 
Chevron’s domain.159 
As annunciated by Justice Stevens, Chevron outlined a two-step in-
quiry for courts to apply when evaluating agency interpretations of fed-
eral statutes.  In step one, the reviewing court considers the statutory text 
to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue.”160  If so, the statute controls, “for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.”161  If the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” however, the court 
proceeds to step two and must defer to the agency’s statutory interpreta-
tion, so long as it “is based on a permissible construction of the sta-
tute.”162  In other words, at step two, the agency’s interpretation is given 
 
 153. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 154. As Eskridge and Baer note, the Supreme Court had been “highly deferential to agency in-
terpretations before Chevron.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Defe-
rence: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120 (2008). 
 155. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 402 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006); Robert V. Percival, Environ-
mental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10637, 
10644 (2005). 
 156. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 154, at 1087 (“Almost immediately, Reagan Administration 
officials and appointees proclaimed a ‘Chevron Revolution.’”); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in 
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986).  As Eskridge and Baer note, even Che-
vron’s early critics recognized its potential impact.  See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 154, at 1089. 
 157. Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 188. 
 158. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 154, at 1088. 
 159. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 835–37. 
 160. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 161. Id. at 842–43. 
 162. Id. at 843. 
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“controlling weight” unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute.”163  Importantly, the agency is not required to follow 
the statutory interpretation that the reviewing court would adopt if the 
court were construing the statute on its own.  As the Court explained in 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, “the courts must respect the interpretation of 
the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for admi-
nistering the statutory program.”164 
Chevron made clear that courts must defer to reasonable agency in-
terpretations when statutes are unclear or ambiguous.  In such cases, 
courts presume that Congress delegated interpretive responsibility to the 
implementing agency, even if the delegation was not explicit.  The Che-
vron Court stated that statutory ambiguities themselves are evidence that 
Congress intended an implied delegation of authority.165  While the Court 
did not note it at the time, this approach “effected a fundamental trans-
formation in the relationship between courts and agencies.”166 
Courts and commentators have offered several justifications for de-
ferring to agencies’ statutory interpretations, including agency expertise, 
political accountability, and a desire for regulatory uniformity.  Each of 
these rationales could be used to justify Chevron deference generally, but 
which one predominates has important implications for whether the 
scope of Chevron’s domain is broad or narrow. 
One rationale for Chevron deference is that agencies have more fa-
miliarity with and expertise in the statute in question and its subject mat-
ter.167  Federal judges are, of necessity, legal generalists.168  Agency offi-
cials are specialists.  A court or judge may be asked to interpret a 
particular statutory provision infrequently, but agency officials can be 
expected to deal with their implementing legislation every day.  In some 
cases, agencies may have been involved in identifying and defining (and 
perhaps contributing to) the problems a given statute is designed to ad-
dress.  They also may have participated in the actual drafting of statutory 
provisions; many regulatory statutes are based on proposals developed 
 
 163. Id. at 844. 
 164. 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). 
 165. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute 
by regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit 
rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory pro-
vision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citations omitted)). 
 166. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 834. 
 167. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 589–90 (1985). 
 168. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either 
political branch of Government.”). 
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within federal agencies.169  Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect 
that agencies are more likely to adopt the interpretation that is most con-
sistent with the drafters’ intent or underlying purpose. 
A second rationale is that deference to agency interpretations en-
hances accountability because federal agencies, as part of the executive 
branch, are “political.”170  Interpreting statutes requires agencies to make 
policy judgments.  Those decisions should be entrusted to agency offi-
cials (who ultimately are accountable to the president), not courts 
(which, as a matter of institutional design, are insulated and unaccounta-
ble).171  Courts are not to evaluate the relative merits of competing policy 
proposals when an agency action is challenged in court.  “Such policy ar-
guments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, 
not to judges.”172  Agencies can be held accountable if they adopt discre-
tionary policies that are unpopular or inconsistent with the views of 
elected officials.  While this rationale is more attenuated in the context of 
independent agencies,173 insofar as such agencies are headed by officials 
appointed for limited terms and subject to executive and legislative over-
sight, they are still more likely to be politically accountable than are 
courts. 
Deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes is also more 
likely to ensure a degree of uniformity in federal law.174  Given the com-
plexity of many federal regulatory statutes, it is inevitable that different 
circuit courts will adopt different interpretations of particular statutory 
provisions.  Agencies thus could find themselves subject to legal con-
straints in, say, California that do not apply in West Virginia.  Eventual 
 
 169. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, which led to the creation of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, was largely based on a proposal developed within 
the Department of Labor.  See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 10–15 (5th ed. 2006) (summarizing the history of the OSH Act).  Indeed, the “initial im-
petus” for the legislation “came, not from organized labor, but from officials in the Labor Department 
dissatisfied with the limited scope of their authority to regulate workplace safety.”  Id. at 11. 
 170. Of course, there is a strong argument that most such decisions should actually be made by 
the peoples’ elected representatives in Congress.  See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER 
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). 
 171. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Inter-
pretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 303 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Defe-
rence to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (such policy determinations 
are “not for the courts but for the political branches”); Starr, supra note 156, at 309. 
 172. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[D]eference is not abdication . . . .”). 
 173. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 259 n.175. 
 174. See Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred-Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121–22 
(1987).  Insofar as the Supreme Court’s docket has decreased by almost 50 percent since the time of 
Strauss’ article, the uniformity-reinforcing aspects of Chevron deference could be more important.  See 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 861 n.156. 
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Supreme Court review can restore uniformity, but in the meantime fed-
eral laws will mean different things in different parts of the country. 
While Chevron is now an established fixture of administrative law, 
there has been a significant academic debate about its legal pedigree.175  
Some commentators argue that Chevron is ultimately grounded in consti-
tutional separation-of-powers principles.176  Others suggest Chevron 
should be seen as a rule of federal common law.177  Chevron itself may 
have been somewhat ambiguous on this point,178 but the Supreme Court 
has been fairly consistent in recent years in maintaining that congres-
sional delegation is the basis for according deference to agency interpre-
tations of ambiguous statutes.  As the Court stated in Adams Fruit Co. v. 
Barrett:  “A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional 
delegation of administrative authority.”179  Chevron thus is a “legislatively 
mandated deference doctrine.”180 
A decade later, in Christensen v. Harris County,181 a majority of the 
Court held that Congress can only be said to have impliedly delegated 
the power to interpret ambiguous statutory language when it has granted 
an agency power to take actions that bind the public with the “force of 
law.”182  Other agency interpretations, the Court held, should only re-
ceive the lesser form of deference known as Skidmore deference.183  The 
scope of an agency’s authority to authoritatively interpret ambiguous sta-
 
 175. For representative critiques of Chevron, see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and 
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV 452, 456 (1989); Michael Herz, 
Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
U. 187, 189–90 (1992). 
 176. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 26–70 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron 
and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2232–34 (1997); Starr, supra note 156, at 283. 
 177. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618–19 (1992); David M. Hasen, 
The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 345–54 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–17 (2000) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons]. 
 178. Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 195 (“[T]he [Chevron] Court “announced its two-step 
approach without giving a clear sense of the theory that justified it.”); id. at 197 (“The Chevron Court’s 
approach was much clearer than the rationale that accounted for it.”). 
 179. 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990); see also Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 
465, 479 n.14 (1997) (explaining that Chevron deference “arises out of background presumptions of 
congressional intent” (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996))); Merrill & Hick-
man, supra note 12, at 863 (observing that “[t]he Court . . . has rather consistently opted for the con-
gressional intent theory” as the legal foundation for Chevron deference). 
 180. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 836 (“Chevron rests on implied congressional intent.”); 
id. at 869 (“Chevron itself and most post-Chevron decisions describe the doctrine as flowing from the 
implicit instructions of Congress.”); see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should 
Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 (1990) (“The threshold issue for the court is 
always one of congressional intent: did Congress intend the agency’s interpretation to bind the 
courts?”). 
 181. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 182. Id. at 587–88. 
 183. Id. at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
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tutory text only extends as far as the agency’s own authority to take ac-
tions with the force of law.184  Further, since Chevron deference is ulti-
mately a function of Congress’s intent to delegate interpretive authority 
to agencies, any presumption in favor of such deference may be rebutted 
by evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.185 
Whatever doubt remained about Chevron’s foundation after Adams 
Fruit and Christensen was quieted by United States v. Mead Corp.186  Con-
cluding that the United States Customs Service’s tariff classification rul-
ings were not entitled to Chevron deference, the Court made clear that 
congressional intent is the touchstone for the analysis.187  Chevron applies 
“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency gener-
ally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpre-
tation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that author-
ity.”188  There are many ways Congress may demonstrate its intention to 
delegate interpretive authority (including, as in Mead itself, by granting 
authority to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking).189  But without 
such delegation, an agency’s decision is not due Chevron deference. 
The actuality of congressional delegation is often characterized as a 
“legal fiction,”190 but grounding Chevron deference in congressional in-
tent has several implications.  For starters, it means that Chevron is not a 
constitutional doctrine, but rather one rooted in statute and subject to 
congressional revision.191  This approach is consistent with the language 
of the Administrative Procedure Act, which instructs that courts, not 
agencies, are to decide relevant questions of law.192  Because Chevron de-
ference ultimately rests upon legislative intent, it “should apply only 
where Congress would want Chevron to apply.”193  As Professors Merrill 
 
 184. Christenson, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 185. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 837.  The Court suggested that delegation should 
be presumed in Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 526 U.S. 380, 389–90 (1999). 
 186. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  As Eskridge & Baer observe, “Mead appears to have partially settled 
the debate within the Court about the conditions for triggering Chevron deference . . . .”  Eskridge & 
Baer, supra note 154, at 1123.  Their empirical analysis also concludes that the Court’s actual practice 
supports the Mead and Oregon understanding of Chevron.  Id. (noting, however, that “the Court’s 
practice has been inconsistent”). 
 187. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 812 (2002) (“At the most general level, Mead eliminates any doubt 
that Chevron deference is grounded in congressional intent.”). 
 188. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 189. Id. at 227. 
 190. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 
(1986); Scalia, supra note 171, at 517; Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 192; see also David J. Bar-
ron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212–25 (2002). 
 191. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 863 (observing that the Chevron doctrine has “roughly 
the same status in law as a federal statute”). 
 192. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 23–24 (1996). 
 193. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 872. 
ADLER.DOCX 9/14/2009  1:36 PM 
No. 5] THE REST IS SILENCE 1527 
and Hickman observe, this, in turn, “suggests that Chevron’s domain 
should be relatively narrow, rather than broad.”194  A more sweeping in-
terpretation of Chevron “is not faithful to the logic of implied delegation 
on which Chevron rests.”195 
Another implication of Chevron’s legal pedigree is what Professors 
Merrill and Hickman have termed “step zero”:  “[T]he inquiry that must 
be made in deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron frame-
work at all.”196  According to Professor Sunstein, “If the underlying 
theory involves implicit (and fictional) delegation, the real question is 
when Congress should be understood to have delegated law-interpreting 
power to an agency.”197  If there has been no delegation of interpretive 
authority to a federal agency, impliedly or explicitly, then there is no ba-
sis to apply Chevron, and the Court should either apply the lesser form of 
deference, known as Skidmore deference, or refuse to defer at all. 
Congress is (nearly) always free to explicitly delegate interpretive 
authority.  Absent the application of some newly revised nondelegation 
principle or other constitutional limitation, Congress may expressly au-
thorize federal agencies to provide clarity to and fill the interstices of 
federal administrative law.  Where Congress has not been express, how-
ever, courts will only find that Congress has impliedly delegated interpre-
tive power where it has delegated to an agency the authority to adopt 
regulations or take other actions that bind the public with the force of 
law.198  As Professor Herz pointed out, where Chevron speaks of “filling 
gaps” left by Congress, it is “misleading.”199  It implies that the agency is 
operating on the same “horizontal plane” as Congress when it is actually 
acting as Congress’s agent exercising delegated powers.200 
A third implication of Mead is that a statutory ambiguity is no long-
er, by itself, sufficient evidence of a congressional intent to delegate in-
terpretive responsibility to an agency.  After Mead, courts must look for 
other evidence that Congress meant to do so, such as giving the agency 
power to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, or in other (unspe-
 
 194. Id.; see also id. at 859 (“[E]xpanding the Chevron doctrine to cover most or all of the un-
iverse of situations in which deference is possible would constitute an over-application of the notion of 
mandatory deference, and as a byproduct of over-application, would likely lead to dilution of the prac-
tice of deferring to agency interpretations of law.”). 
 195. Id. at 883. 
 196. Id. at 836; see also Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 191. 
 197. Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 208. 
 198. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 837. 
 199. Herz, supra note 175, at 230. 
 200. Id. at 230–31. 
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cified) ways.201  Professor Adrian Vermeule, a Mead critic, puts it this 
way: 
Rather than taking ambiguity to signify delegation, Mead establish-
es that the default rule runs against delegation.  Unless the review-
ing court affirmatively finds that Congress intended to delegate in-
terpretive authority to the particular agency at hand, in the 
particular statutory scheme at hand, Chevron deference is not due 
and the Chevron two-step is not to be invoked.202 
As such, a reviewing court “must determine whether power has been de-
legated to an agency before the court can be charged with deferring to 
the agency’s exercise of that power.”203  This suggests that certain types of 
questions are less likely to be subject to the Chevron framework.  “Step 
zero” probably means more work for reviewing courts, which cannot 
simply defer to agencies willy-nilly but now must answer threshold ques-
tions about whether Chevron applies in the first place.204 
In determining the nature of the delegation to an agency, courts are 
essentially determining the scope of an agency’s power—i.e., the scope of 
agency jurisdiction.  The impropriety of deference to agency determina-
tions of their own jurisdiction is grounded in part in the nature of agency 
authority.  Agencies have no inherent regulatory powers, only those 
powers delegated to them by Congress.  Absent a congressional enact-
ment an agency has no regulatory authority.205  Because it requires affir-
mative legislative action to create agency power, we should not presume 
agency authority without clear evidence of such congressional intent.  A 
general presumption against the existence of delegated agency authority 
would seem to entail a generalized presumption against the delegation of 
authority for an agency to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction.  
This is the core of our proposal, and we now turn to its specifics. 
 
 201. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 251 (2001) (“[A]s significant as notice-and-
comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the 
case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative 
formality was required and none was afforded.”). 
 202. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 348 
(2003). 
 203. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 910–11. 
 204. See Vermeule, supra note 202, at 356–58 (criticizing Mead for imposing an unnecessarily 
complex legal regime on lower courts). 
 205. At the risk of stating the obvious, we should emphasize that this Article only discusses the 
scope of agency powers relating to domestic lawmaking.  The questions of whether administrative 
agencies (or the president) have inherent powers in matters of foreign relations and national security, 
and whether Congress may limit any such powers, are well beyond the scope of this Article.  When we 
write things like “Congress is the source of all agency power,” the reader should mentally supply the 
phrase “in matters of domestic lawmaking.” 
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS AND STATUTORY 
SILENCES 
As Chevron and its progeny make clear, deference to agency inter-
pretation of the statutes the agency administers is grounded in the idea 
that Congress has delegated that authority to the agency.  This is often a 
reasonable assumption, as there are many reasons why Congress might 
prefer that agencies fill the interstices of a given statutory scheme.  Con-
gress is not capable of anticipating every eventuality,206 nor does Con-
gress have the fine-grained expertise agencies may develop over time.  
But there is no reason to presume that agencies have the same level of 
expertise in jurisdictional questions as they do in the subject matter of 
their expertise. 
Of course the analysis, and our proposal, is not so simple, for juris-
dictional questions come in all shapes and sizes.  An agency might interp-
ret a statute to grant it jurisdiction, or it might read the law to deny it ju-
risdiction.  Under our proposal, courts should decline to afford Chevron 
deference regardless of whether an agency is asserting or disclaiming ju-
risdiction.  This is true partly because the nature of the question asked, 
rather than the agency’s answer, is what should determine whether defe-
rence is due; and also because there is a risk of aggrandizement even in 
situations where agencies disclaim regulatory power.  At the same time, 
courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that an agency lacks the 
regulatory jurisdiction at issue.207  Practically, the combination of a no-
deference rule with a rebuttable presumption against delegation may 
make it more difficult, at the margin, for agencies to demonstrate juris-
diction.  Yet it will not prevent Congress from giving agencies regulatory 
authority where Congress wishes to do so.208 
Courts generally agree, even if only implicitly, that the difference 
between assertions and disclaimers of jurisdiction is irrelevant to whether 
an agency interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference.209  The D.C. 
Circuit has described jurisdiction-asserting and -disclaiming interpreta-
tions as “analytically indistinguishable.”210  Indeed, courts seldom distin-
 
 206. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1981) (noting that Congress cannot “le-
gislate with regard to every possible action the President” may need to take). 
 207. See Vermeule, supra note 202, at 348 (noting Mead established that the default rule runs 
against delegation). 
 208. It would, however, make it more difficult for Congress to escape accountability for delega-
tions of jurisdiction by enacting vague statutes and then blaming “out of control” agencies for assert-
ing excessive jurisdiction.  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 177, at 618–19. 
 209. See, e.g., N.Y. Shipping Ass’n v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 210. Id.; see also Air Courier Conference of Am., Int’l Comm. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 
1225 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting the proposition “that deference is inappropriate” when an agency seeks to 
advance “its own bureaucratic self-interest runs counter to Chevron”); cf. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n 
v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (remarking, in a related context, 
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guish between them.  There are some notable exceptions, however.  A 
contemporaneous D.C. Circuit case highlighted the “special concerns” 
posed by an agency’s efforts to “increase its own authority or jurisdic-
tion,” and proposed that less judicial scrutiny is necessary where an 
agency ‘“disclaims rather than asserts a power.’”211 Another court held 
that the judiciary ought to be especially vigilant with “‘statutes enacted 
specifically to prohibit agency action,’” and suggested that “less defe-
rence is owed to agency determinations that expand an agency’s jurisdic-
tion.”212  These holdings implicitly adopt the premise that agency aggran-
dizement is a particular concern where agencies seek greater authority.  
While this may be true as a general matter, it is important to recognize 
that agency refusals to assert jurisdiction can serve agency interests and 
contravene congressional intent.213 
Should the strength of our no-deference rule depend on the quanti-
ty of power an agency is claiming?  A given case may implicate (a) 
whether jurisdiction exists at all, (b) the scope of existing jurisdiction, or 
(c) the existence of a factual predicate necessary for the existence of ju-
risdiction.  The rule against deference should prevail when courts resolve 
questions about the existence or scope of agency regulatory jurisdiction.  
For the reasons outlined above and elucidated below, courts are in a bet-
ter position than implementing agencies to determine the extent of juris-
diction.  The presumption against delegation of authority is strongest in 
existence cases, and the case for deference is at its weakest.  But defe-
rence is also inappropriate in scope cases.  Not only are aggrandizement 
concerns still present, but it is also difficult to draw a line that coherently 
distinguishes between cases that implicate the existence or the scope of 
an agency’s jurisdiction.214 
The one type of jurisdictional question on which an agency should 
nonetheless receive deference is when a given factual predicate—or 
“premise fact”215—provides the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction.216  
 
that “we find it difficult to support the distinction drawn in our prior cases between Board decisions 
asserting statutory jurisdiction and those declining to exercise it”). 
 211. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 850 F.2d 694, 699 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 204 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also 
Kokechik Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Sec’y of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 807–08 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., 
dissenting). 
 212. Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Indep. Ins. 
Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 838 F.2d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1988)); cf. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998) (“We also note that 
ascertaining congressional intent is of particular importance where, as here, an agency is attempting to 
expand the scope of its jurisdiction.”). 
 213. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 214. See infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text. 
 215. “Premise facts” are “facts that explicitly or implicitly serve as premises used to decide issues 
of law.”  Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988). 
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The deference an agency receives in this context, however, would not be 
Chevron deference.  Rather, an agency determination that a factual pre-
dicate has been satisfied would receive the deference that agency factual 
determinations ordinarily receive under the Administrative Procedure 
Act; depending on the context, such findings are upheld if they are not 
“arbitrary and capricious” or are supported by “substantial evidence.”217  
The reasons for deferring on factual predicates are fairly straightforward.  
Unlike in existence or scope cases, administrative agencies possess a 
comparative institutional competence in determining the presence of ju-
risdictional facts.218  Also, there is a relatively low risk of agency aggran-
dizement, and the presence of factual predicates is more closely tied to 
traditional agency expertise and thus is more likely to have been dele-
gated to the agency by Congress.219  At the same time, where a given legal 
determination or statutory provision is contingent upon relevant factual 
predicates, this can itself be the source of a statutory ambiguity that may 
be left in the agency’s hands.  Such a standard for factual predicates or 
premise facts shows due regard for an agency’s specialized knowledge 
and expertise without making an agency the judge of its own jurisdic-
tional limits. 
A key element of our proposal is that a statutory silence does not, in 
itself, create an ambiguity about whether power has been sufficiently de-
legated to trigger Chevron deference.  As agencies have no inherent au-
thority, it is a reasonable default assumption that they have no more ju-
risdiction than Congress has clearly provided, explicitly or implicitly.220  
For this reason, where a statute is not ambiguous but is silent on the exis-
tence of agency jurisdiction, courts should presume that no jurisdiction 
exists.  As Judge Sentelle argued in American Bus Ass’n, where the sta-
tute is silent, Chevron is not even implicated.221 
While this aspect of the proposal contradicts the express language 
of Chevron that equates statutory ambiguity and silence,222 it is entirely 
 
 216. See generally Todd S. Aargaard, Factual Premises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency Re-
view Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366 (2009). 
 217. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 218. See Aargaard, supra note 216, at 22 n.99. 
 219. Id. 
 220. It is important to emphasize that this is not a proposal to create an anti-regulatory bias in 
administrative law, nor do we express a preference for private ordering over government regulation.  
The proposal merely embodies a recognition that agencies lack authority absent a legislative delega-
tion and that such a recognition necessarily entails a “default” of no jurisdiction.  Though courts 
should be wary in discovering previously undiscovered agency jurisdiction, nothing in our proposal 
would prevent courts from finding that Congress implicitly delegated regulatory jurisdiction to a given 
agency. 
 221. See Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 8 (2000). 
 222. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“Rather, if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is wheth-
er the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
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consistent with the principles that underlie Chevron and its progeny.  For 
if a statute delegates regulatory authority to an agency to address some 
matters but not others, then it would be inappropriate to presume that 
Congress has delegated further authority to an agency to assert further 
authority on its own initiative.  As Professor Herz counsels, “Congres-
sional silence should, therefore, be understood to leave this power—the 
power to say what Congress has done—with the courts, where it has al-
ways been.”223  In simple terms, a statute delegates the authority it dele-
gates, and the rest is silence.  Failure to disclaim agency authority to re-
gulate is not, in itself, an ambiguity about whether an agency does or 
should have regulatory authority. 
Assertions of jurisdiction 
No deference 
Disclaimers of jurisdiction 
No deference (though 
aggrandizement concerns are weaker) 
Existence of jurisdiction 
No deference 
Scope of jurisdiction 
No deference 
Factual predicate 
Deference (but not 
Chevron deference) 
Statutory Silences
No deference 
IV. THE (IM)PROPRIETY OF DEFERENCE FOR JURISDICTIONAL 
QUESTIONS 
There are many reasons to not extend Chevron deference to agency 
statutory interpretations on the question of whether jurisdiction exists.  
They fall into two basic categories—one derived from familiar adminis-
trative law norms, the other from public choice analysis.  The administra-
tive law argument is fairly straightforward.  First, it is implicit in Chevron 
and its progeny that jurisdictional questions are not eligible for defe-
rence.  Second, the no-deference rule is implied by the very nature of 
administrative agencies—agencies have no inherent powers, and can act 
only to the extent that Congress has delegated them the power to do so.  
Third, agencies can claim no special expertise over courts in determining 
whether Congress meant to grant them particular powers.  A fourth rea-
son for denying Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional interpreta-
tions is that Congress has made plain its intent that courts should resolve 
those questions.  Fifth, the no-deference rule can be justified as a sort of 
 
 223. Herz, supra note 175, at 203. 
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“avoidance canon” by which courts can prevent agencies from assertions 
of jurisdiction that could implicate important separation-of-powers 
norms. 
The lessons of public choice further support our proposal.  First, in-
dependent judicial review of agency jurisdictional interpretations is ne-
cessary to preserve legislative “deals” about the scope of regulatory au-
thority that were struck in Congress.  Successful legislative initiatives are 
almost always the result of compromise, and honoring such compromises 
requires leaving ultimate control over the scope of agency authority in 
the hands of Congress rather than agencies.  Second, denying Chevron 
deference to agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations will create favorable 
incentives both within Congress and the agencies themselves to improve 
the performance of each.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, our pro-
posal protects against the threat of agency self-aggrandizement.  Just as 
foxes should not guard henhouses, agencies should not be entrusted to 
police the limits on their own regulatory authority. 
A. Administrative Law Norms 
1. The Nature of Chevron 
One reason courts should refuse to extend Chevron deference to 
agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations follows from the nature of Che-
vron itself:  The existence of agency jurisdiction is a precondition of Che-
vron deference, and Chevron therefore has no bearing on how that thre-
shold question should be resolved.  Only after it is determined that 
Congress has conferred jurisdiction on an agency does Chevron come in-
to play. 
This understanding of the Chevron framework, implicit in Chevron 
itself,224 was made explicit in Mead.  That case clarified that the basis for 
Chevron deference is a presumption about Congress’s intent to delegate 
policymaking power to an agency.225  Chevron deference is only appro-
priate where evidence suggests that Congress meant to give the agency in 
question the authority to undertake legislative-type policymaking—for 
example, when the agency has been granted and has exercised the power 
to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking.226  Where evidence of such 
congressional intent is lacking, the agency may not invoke the relatively 
 
 224. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 225. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 226. See id. (stating that Chevron applies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to 
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claim-
ing deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); id. at 229 (identifying notice and 
comment rulemaking as “a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment”). 
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deferential Chevron framework.  The best it can hope for is Skidmore de-
ference—which is to say no more deference than a given agency argu-
ment’s power to persuade.227 
The question whether Congress has delegated policymaking power 
to an agency thus is prior to the question whether Chevron deference is 
appropriate.  It is chronologically prior, in the sense that a court typically 
will want to know whether an agency has authority at all before it con-
siders what standard of review should be used to assess the agency’s ex-
ercise of that authority.  More importantly, the jurisdiction question is 
logically prior to the deference question.  Because the existence of agen-
cy jurisdiction is a precondition of Chevron deference,228 it cannot be the 
case that the Chevron framework should be used to resolve that initial 
jurisdictional issue.  Only after the delegation question has been ans-
wered in the affirmative can one move on to address whether deference 
is warranted.  To say that an agency should get the Chevron treatment on 
matters concerning its own jurisdiction is to put the effect (deference) be-
fore the cause (jurisdiction). 
2. The Nature of Agency Power 
An even more basic reason to deny Chevron deference on jurisdic-
tional questions derives from the nature of agencies.  Agencies have no 
inherent powers, only delegated ones.229  That is why they are called 
“administrative agencies”—they are created to administer programs es-
tablished by Congress, and in so doing they act as Congress’s agents.  As 
Professor Monaghan noted, “[T]he universe of each agency is limited by 
the legislative specifications contained in its organic act.”230  This means 
that Congress must delegate an agency the power to act.  If Congress did 
not act, the agency would have no authority.  In the absence of some in-
dication that Congress meant to grant an agency a particular power, 
there is no reason to presume from the agency’s say-so that it properly 
wields that power—and hence no reason to defer to the agency’s asser-
tion of jurisdiction.231 
 
 227. See id. at 234–35. 
 228. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under 
Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.”). 
 229. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an admin-
istrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by 
Congress.”); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no 
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
 230. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983). 
 231. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and 
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1282 
(2002) (“If administrators were given ‘final authority on issues of statutory construction,’ this shift in 
power would substantially undermine our constitutional commitment to representative government.” 
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This is why statutory silences pose the problem of agency jurisdic-
tion so starkly.  When an agency invokes a statute’s silence as a basis for 
its authority to take a certain action—i.e., when the agency argues that 
Congress’s simple failure to rule the action out amounts to a legislative 
authorization—it stands these principles on their head.  Congress is sup-
planted in its role under the Constitution as lawmaker-in-chief, and is re-
duced to reactively “vetoing” through legislation the agency power grabs 
with which it disagrees.  And agencies begin to exercise powers progres-
sively further and further away from their core missions as determined 
by Congress.  Administrative law fairly universally disapproves of agency 
efforts to “arrogate undelegated power.”232  This is the very definition of 
arrogation. 
3. Comparative Institutional Competence 
However much expertise agencies may have at answering technical 
or policy questions, they have no institutional advantage over courts in 
resolving jurisdictional disputes.  To the contrary, courts are required to 
address jurisdictional questions all the time, including ones that implicate 
the scope of federal power.  An agency may be expert in resolving tech-
nical questions within the subject matter of its mission, at understanding 
how given questions interrelate, or even at resolving factual questions 
upon which assertions of jurisdiction ultimately may depend.  But an 
agency has no more expertise than courts at figuring out when jurisdic-
tion exists. 
Jurisdiction is not the sort of question about which an agency could 
be expected to have expertise as a general matter.  It is not a policy or 
technical question, but rather, one of statutory intent:  Did Congress in-
tend for agency X to exercise power Y?  An obvious counterargument is 
that agencies have technical expertise that is relevant to the question of 
whether expanding their jurisdiction will facilitate the broad policy goals 
enunciated by Congress.  This is certainly true, but it sidesteps the rele-
vant inquiry.  In enacting statutes, Congress necessarily resolves tra-
deoffs between competing policy goals and inevitably grants agencies less 
 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))).  Con-
gress always retains the ability to revise statutes and redefine agency jurisdiction, so an agency can 
never be said to be the “final authority” on such questions.  However, due to the institutional obstacles 
that inherently slow the legislative process, as a practical matter, agency interpretations that the courts 
leave undisturbed will often function as the “final” interpretation for some time.  See id. at 1287–88; 
see also id. at 1278 (“The constitutional structure is squarely at odds with allowing administrators to 
police boundaries of their own authority.”); Noah, supra note 16, at 1492–93 (“Administrative agencies 
can no more amend their own organic statutes than the President or Congress could unilaterally 
amend the U.S. Constitution outside the strictures of Article V.”). 
 232. Noah, supra note 16, at 1493–94 (“[A]pparently all [administrative law paradigms] would 
condemn efforts by agencies to arrogate undelegated power.”). 
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power than was conceivably possible.  Whether or not broader agency 
jurisdiction would serve the agency’s mission does not mean Congress 
delegated such authority, nor does it mean courts should defer to the 
agency’s interpretation.  If Congress desires an agency to have broader 
jurisdiction, it should make its intent clear.  And if necessary, agencies 
retain the ability to seek greater authority from Congress. 
The above argument for deference has it exactly backwards:  Courts 
are the ones with a comparative advantage at resolving jurisdictional 
questions in a consistent and predictable fashion.  Judicial perspectives 
do not swing with each change in presidential administration.233  And as 
Professor Molot has pointed out, “Judges . . . are subject to strong insti-
tutional norms that render judicial interpretation more stable and consis-
tent over time than interpretation by successive political administra-
tions.”234  However imperfect judicial decisions may be, they are more 
likely to reflect the faithful application of precedent, applicable legal 
norms, and canons of construction than equivalent decisions made by 
agencies headed by executive officials. 
It is certainly possible—and in some cases quite likely—that an ad-
ministrative agency will have greater knowledge or expertise about the 
legislative intent behind a given administrative statute.235  Indeed, in 
some cases the agency may itself have drafted or participated in structur-
ing the statute at issue.  The existence of agency expertise, or other insti-
tutional competence, does not mean that agencies should have the au-
thority to construe statutory provisions limiting their own jurisdiction.  
As Professor Nelson observes, “To the extent that generalist courts are 
less prone to tunnel vision than specialist agencies, courts may actually 
be better positioned to make those judgments than the typical agency.”236  
Further, that an agency has some knowledge of the legislative deal that 
produced a given statute, perhaps even by virtue of its participation in 
the legislative deal-making process, does not mean that an agency is a re-
liable source of statutory meaning.  The ultimate deal struck is unlikely 
to match the legislative proposal advanced by the agency, nor is an agen-
cy’s interpretation likely to be immune from the agency’s perceived self-
 
 233. This is not to deny that the appointing president’s ideology or political affiliation may have 
an effect on judicial behavior.  Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Poli-
cy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824–25 (2006).  Even if judges are 
“political” or “ideological” in this fashion, the overall political orientation of courts changes slowly 
over time with the gradual replacement of judicial personnel, resulting in fewer dramatic and unpre-
dicted doctrinal shifts, particularly in the Courts of Appeals. 
 234. Molot, supra note 231, at 11. 
 235. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 215 (2006). 
 236. Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 359 
(2007). 
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interest.  That Congress could well conclude that it would be a good idea 
to give agencies greater regulatory jurisdiction—or even the authority to 
define the scope of that jurisdiction—does not mean that Congress can 
or should be presumed to have done so. 
4. The Administrative Procedure Act 
Another reason to leave jurisdictional questions in the hands of 
courts is because Congress has made clear its intention to do just that.  
Under Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), review-
ing courts are to decide “all relevant questions of law.”237  Determining 
the existence or scope of agency authority, unlike answering a complex 
technical or scientific question or making a policy judgment about how 
best to implement a regulatory regime, requires answering a question of 
law about whether Congress delegated authority to a given regulatory 
agency. 
The APA further recognizes jurisdiction as a distinct legal inquiry.238  
In the APA, the term “jurisdiction” is used to denote the limited sphere 
of agency power.  Section 558(b), for instance, provides that “[a] sanction 
may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except within 
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”239  Agen-
cies only have authority to implement and enforce a law or regulation 
when the underlying jurisdiction exists.  The implication is that agencies 
only have authority to interpret statutory ambiguities—i.e., Chevron only 
applies—once it is independently established that the underlying jurisdic-
tion exists.  Section 706(2)(C) further provides that courts are to invali-
date and set aside those agency actions determined to be “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right.”240  However fuzzy or otherwise difficult to apply the concept of ju-
risdiction may be, Congress clearly saw a distinction between questions 
of agency jurisdiction and other limitations on agency power.241 
One response to this argument, suggested by Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Mead, is that deferring to agency interpretations does not involve dis-
placing courts from their obligation to answer questions of law.  It simply 
changes the legal question that courts are left to answer.  When a court 
defers to an agency, the legal question is no longer what is the proper in-
 
 237. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 238. See Noah, supra note 16, at 1524. 
 239. 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (emphasis added); see also John Duffy, Administrative Common Law in 
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 198–99 (1998). 
 240. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 
 241. See also Noah, supra note 16, at 1524 (noting Congress “considered amending the APA to 
reinforce the judicial function in reviewing statutory questions, particularly on jurisdictional issues”). 
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terpretation of the statute, but whether the agency has exceeded the 
scope of its discretion.242 
The problem with this argument is that it conflates questions of law 
and policy.  As we have stressed throughout this Article, all agency pow-
er comes from Congress.  Agencies only have authority to engage in in-
terpretation and exercise interpretive discretion when Congress has al-
ready delegated such authority.  So to shift interpretive authority to an 
agency is to presume, as a matter of law, that a delegation occurred and 
to relieve the courts of determining whether, in fact, such a delegation 
occurred.  Such a move may well make sense on policy grounds.  Yet 
there is no basis for presuming that this is what Congress intended, let 
alone actually enacted.  As Professors Merrill and Hickman note, “Jus-
tice Brennan was surely right in principle:  Congress cannot be presumed 
to intend that courts defer to agency judgments about the scope of their 
jurisdiction.”243  No doubt Justice Scalia endorses this approach in order 
to reduce the likelihood that an unelected judge will make policy judg-
ments he believes should remain in the hands of more accountable politi-
cal branches.  But such a move necessarily involves shifting responsibility 
for answering certain legal questions from courts to administrative agen-
cies—a move contrary to the language of the APA. 
The delegation understanding of Chevron is also the surest way to 
reconcile Chevron with the language of the APA.244  The APA’s re-
quirement that courts are to answer questions of law is not an unaltera-
ble rule.  Rather, like any statutory provision, it may be amended or 
overridden by Congress.  In this way, the APA provides administrative 
default rules that may be overridden by subsequent Congresses in the 
context of specific statutory schemes—something the APA itself explicit-
ly contemplates (albeit with the requirement that subsequent statutes su-
persede the APA’s requirements “expressly”).245  So, the APA not only 
reinforces the presumption that agencies should not receive deference 
when considering jurisdictional questions, but also allows Congress to 
adopt administrative statutes with different presumptions. 
 
 242. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
 243. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 12, at 910. 
 244. See Anthony, supra note 192, at 24–27. 
 245. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (“Subsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify this subchapter, 
chapter 7, sections 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(E), 5372, or 7521 of this title, or the provisions of section 
5335(a)(B) of this title that relate to administrative law judges, except to the extent that it does so ex-
pressly.”). 
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5. Nondelegation and Constitutional Avoidance 
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance further counsels against 
deferring to agencies on jurisdictional questions.  At the risk of sounding 
repetitive, our first principle is that agencies only have those powers—
and that jurisdiction—which have been conferred by Congress.  If an 
ambiguity, let alone a statutory silence, is sufficient to trigger Chevron 
deference, an ambiguous statute may become license for an agency to 
control the scope of its own authority, and perhaps even the ability to 
create regulatory authority where no such authority legitimately ex-
isted.246 
As a general matter, courts seek to avoid statutory interpretations 
that raise difficult constitutional questions.247  When Congress enacts a 
statute, it is presumed to have acted within constitutional bounds.  Thus, 
where there are competing possible interpretations of a given statute, 
courts should adopt an interpretation that places less pressure of consti-
tutional limits on federal authority.  This concern would seem to justify a 
“nondelegation canon”248 that would create at least a rebuttable pre-
sumption that Congress has not delegated an agency authority to deter-
mine the scope of its own jurisdiction.  While the nondelegation doctrine 
lacks much independent force today, it has developed into something 
akin to an avoidance canon and thus remains influential in statutory in-
terpretation.249 
This approach is applied quite regularly in the federalism context to 
avoid the adoption of agency interpretations that might stretch the 
bounds of federal regulatory authority, even where there is potential sta-
tutory ambiguity that would, under normal circumstances, trigger Che-
vron deference.  Thus, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Rapanos v. United States—two cas-
es implicating the scope of federal regulatory authority over wetlands 
and other waters of the United States under the Clean Water Act—the 
 
 246. Such power to create regulatory jurisdiction where none existed is quintessentially “legisla-
tive” power.  See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot 2-4 (San 
Diego Legal Studies Paper, No. 07-54, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=921743. 
 247. See Solid Waste Agency N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 
(2001) (“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ 
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. 
v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise 
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will con-
strue the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988). 
 248. See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 177, at 331–35. 
 249. Manning, supra note 173, at 223 (“The nondelegation doctrine . . . now operates exclusively 
through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional questions.”). 
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Court refused to defer to the Army Corps’ and the EPA’s interpretation 
of the Act because the agencies’ interpretation would push the outer 
bounds of the federal government’s power to regulate commerce “among 
the several states.”250  Rather than delineate the precise bounds of the 
federal government’s authority to regulate interstate commerce, the 
Court adopted an interpretation of the Act that left federal regulatory 
authority safely within its constitutional limits.251 
When applying an avoidance canon, courts presume that if Congress 
wants to change the extent of its own powers, it will do so directly, and 
will not delegate such questions to an executive agency.252  So, for in-
stance, where federalism questions are present, a court will stay at Che-
vron step one and resolve ambiguities itself.  The presence of a constitu-
tional question provides sufficient grounds for presuming that Congress 
did not delegate to an agency the relevant authority to resolve ambigui-
ties in the statute.  For the same reason, courts should embrace a “non-
delegation canon” that presumes Congress did not delegate an agency 
autonomous authority over its own jurisdiction unless a statute explicitly 
so provides.  “Delegations may have run riot, but deference should not, 
even in the name of respect for such delegations.”253 
B. Public Choice Principles 
Our proposal finds support not only in administrative law norms 
and conventions of statutory interpretation.  Public choice principles and 
concern for the incentives under which agencies operate further rein-
force the case for limiting deference in the jurisdictional context and re-
cognizing that statutory silences are, in fact, silent.  In particular, denying 
Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional interpretations will help pre-
serve the legislative deals upon which statutes are based, provide Con-
gress and agencies alike with favorable incentives, and mitigate the risk 
of agency self-aggrandizement.254 
 
 250. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173. 
 251. See Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, With Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of Clean Water Act 
Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 81 (L. Kinvin 
Wroth ed., Vermont Law School, 2007). 
 252. See Manning, supra note 173, at 223. 
 253. Herz, supra note 175, at 187. 
 254. Some of the arguments we make in this Section might be read as more ambitious pleas for 
Chevron to be discarded root and branch, and replaced with a regime of de novo judicial review for all 
agency statutory interpretations.  We make no such argument.  Our aim is to domesticate Chevron, not 
to bury it.  Nor does our no-deference rule for jurisdictional questions necessarily entail the proposi-
tion that Chevron should be abolished even in nonjurisdictional cases.  If one were designing a defe-
rence regime from the ground up, one would want to weigh (among many other considerations) the 
risk that a rule of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations might make it prohibitively 
difficult for courts to resolve legal disputes (i.e., the risk of excessive decision costs), as well as the like-
lihood that courts might arrogate to themselves policymaking powers that properly lie with the politi-
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1. Preserving the Deal 
From a public choice perspective, legislation is a “deal” among 
competing interests, each vying for advantage through the legislative 
process.255  Various interest groups with different goals, priorities, and 
“interests,” seek to assemble coalitions sufficient to enact legislation.  In 
the process, groups with competing priorities make compromises with 
one another.  On any given issue, interest groups with strong or “ex-
treme” positions make compromises with those that are more “mod-
erate.”  Rarely does any group get everything it wants, especially not 
without providing something of value to other interest groups.256  As Pro-
fessors Rodriguez and Weingast explain, “[T]o understand the contours 
of the ultimate legislative bargain, it is important to understand the na-
ture and scope of the compromise that enabled the bargain to pass Con-
gress.”257 
The scope of a statute is a key component of a legislative deal.  Re-
stricting the scope of a statute can be an important compromise mechan-
ism, as it blunts the impact of the statutory measure.258  The prospect that 
courts might defer to agency constructions of their own jurisdiction 
threatens to take such measures of compromise off the table.259  It also 
can make it more difficult for legislators to engage in rent extraction.260  
 
cal branches (i.e., the risk of judicial aggrandizement).  Both risks seem likely to be greater where 
courts are called upon to review agencies’ nonjurisdictional interpretations de novo and weaker where 
they review jurisdictional interpretations without deference.  Partly, this is because jurisdictional cases 
probably occur less frequently than nonjurisdictional ones.  More to the point, because courts have 
less expertise in figuring out how to administer an agency’s regulatory program than they do in resolv-
ing questions of statutory interpretation and jurisdiction, see supra Part IV.A.3, it seems that decision 
costs would be substantially higher in nonjurisdictional cases.  In addition, there are probably more 
opportunities for courts to smuggle their policy preferences into disputes about an agency’s adminis-
tration of a regulatory program than disputes about the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction; it is likely 
that judicial aggrandizement would occur more frequently in nonjurisdictional cases.  In short, nonju-
risdictional cases present unique risks of excessive decision costs and judicial aggrandizement, which 
justify retaining the Chevron framework in that context even as we call for it to be abandoned for ju-
risdictional questions.  (Of course, this argument depends on the ability to distinguish meaningfully 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional cases, a topic to which we return in Part V.A infra.) 
 255. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 876 (1975); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regu-
lation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP A. FRICKEY, 
LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE 12–37 (1991). 
 256. The one exception to this may be “logrolling,” in which interest groups agree to support each 
others’ priorities—such as spending requests—without needing to compromise any of their own. 
 257. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpreta-
tions, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (2007). 
 258. Id. at 1216. 
 259. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983) (“What matters 
to the compromisers is reducing the chance that their work will be invoked subsequently to achieve 
more, or less, than they intended, thereby upsetting the balance of the package.”). 
 260. On the importance of rent extraction in describing political behavior, see generally FRED S. 
MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 
(1997).  According to McChesney, one form of rent extraction occurs when politicians promise not to 
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Just as overly expansive (or restrictive) readings of legislation by courts 
may discourage future compromises, allowing agencies to expand (or 
contract) the scope of their own jurisdiction beyond the terms of the 
original legislative deal may impede future deals.261  If those moderates 
whose concurrence is necessary to reach a majority compromise cannot 
be assured that the deal will be kept, they will forego future compromis-
es. 
Because legislative deals are not self-enforcing, the existence of an 
independent judiciary helps cement the deal by providing an indepen-
dent enforcement mechanism.262  One purpose of judicial review of agen-
cy action is to ensure that agencies do not stray too far from the legisla-
tive deal they are entrusted to enforce.263  Indeed, notwithstanding any 
risk that the judiciary may upset the legislative deal, “the independent 
judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group 
theory of government.”264 
If one presumes that agencies may be prone to expand their own ju-
risdiction, one should not also presume that a statutory ambiguity consti-
tutes an implicit delegation of authority to an agency to expand its au-
thority in the future.  Enacting a statute both confers and restricts 
jurisdiction, and it cannot be presumed that legislators always prefer 
more of a good thing.  Legislation confers limited authority because 
there are tradeoffs and diminishing marginal returns in pursuing a single 
policy goal to the exclusion of all other concerns.265  Judge Easterbrook 
has emphasized that “[l]egislators seeking only to further the public in-
terest may conclude that that provision of public rules should reach so far 
and no farther,” whether due to political compromise or inherent eco-
nomic tradeoffs.266  While judges many not be in a better position to iden-
tify the precise stopping point in every instance in which the statutory 
text is unclear, it is implausible to believe that administrative agencies 
prone to “tunnel vision” would be consistently better. 
Interest groups certainly have incentives to defer some decisions, 
and punt such questions to agencies or the courts.  A legislative com-
promise may well include the decision to leave some questions unre-
 
take action that will harm interest groups.  Id. at 25.  If administrative agencies are capable of expand-
ing their own jurisdiction, it is more difficult for politicians to give the assurances necessary for rent 
extraction to be successful. 
 261. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 257, at 1209 (“Expansionary reading of existing sta-
tutes by judges inhibits congressional passage of new progressive legislation.”). 
 262. Landes & Posner, supra note 255, at 879. 
 263. See id. at 888. 
 264. Id. at 877. 
 265. Easterbrook, supra note 259, at 541 (“No matter how good the end in view, achievement of 
the end will have some cost, and at some point the cost will begin to exceed the benefits.”). 
 266. Id. 
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solved.267  At the margin, this tendency may even have increased in recent 
years.  Professors Macey and Miller observe that increased interest group 
specialization and influence has made legislative consensus more diffi-
cult, prompting Congress to enact “increasingly broad and amorphous 
enabling legislation that delegates controversial matters to administrative 
agencies.”268  Nonetheless, it is likely that such deliberate ambiguity is 
more often concerned with the way jurisdiction is to be exercised than 
with the existence of jurisdiction in the first place.  Congress is more like-
ly to leave unresolved “pure” policy questions about how agency jurisdic-
tion is exercised than the fundamental question of whether agency juris-
diction exists at all. 
If agencies are the ultimate source of authority over their own juris-
diction, this can create instability that undermines legislative interest-
group deals.  Among other things, it puts the extent of a deal up for grabs 
every time a political administration shifts.269  Interest groups that be-
lieved their interests were “protected” by a prior deal have less such as-
surance if an agency may redefine its own jurisdiction upon the discovery 
of a statutory gap or ambiguity.  Indeed, such threats are inevitable inso-
far as any administrative statute will, inevitably, be found to have an am-
biguity of one sort or another.270  While Congress retains substantial 
oversight authority with regard to how agencies exercise their regulatory 
jurisdiction, such oversight may be less effective in controlling an agen-
cy’s assertion of jurisdiction. 
2. Deference and Incentives 
Denying Chevron deference to agencies’ jurisdictional interpreta-
tions is desirable for another reason:  A no-deference rule creates posi-
tive incentives for Congress and agencies alike and also mitigates the 
negative incentives that would prevail in a regime where deference is 
available (or where there is uncertainty as to whether deference is avail-
able). 
 
 267. Id. at 540 (“Almost all statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise 
is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved.”). 
 268. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial 
Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1992). 
 269. Change in legislative majorities can also threaten prior interest-group deals, but only to a 
lesser extent due to the various “vetogates” that make it difficult to pass superseding legislation.  See 
Landes & Posner, supra note 255, at 878.  On “vetogates,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empi-
ricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 677 n.13 (1999) (defining “ve-
togate” as “a place within a process where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed”). 
 270. See Landes & Posner, supra note 255, at 879 (“[T]he limits of human foresight, the ambigui-
ties of language, and the high cost of legislative deliberation combine to assure that most legislation 
will be enacted in a seriously incomplete form, with many areas of uncertainty left to be resolved by 
the courts.”). 
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a. Congress 
A no-deference rule would incentivize Congress to legislate with 
greater precision.  Specifically, denying Chevron deference to agency ju-
risdictional interpretations would mitigate at least some of Congress’s in-
centives to enact ambiguous statutes that do not clearly answer whether 
an agency is to wield a particular power or not.  A no-deference rule thus 
would help discipline Congress, encouraging it to resolve more of the 
questions that a deference regime would leave to administrative agencies 
to decide. 
Our first principle is that, in matters of domestic lawmaking, con-
gressional action is preferable to agency action for the simple reason that 
Congress is more accountable to voters than agencies are.  This is not to 
deny that agencies can be held to account.  Plainly they can, especially 
executive agencies that are answerable to the president, who in turn is 
answerable to voters.  Indeed, Chevron itself is premised on the notion 
that agencies are subject to democratic checks, at least compared to fed-
eral judges:  “Judges . . . are not part of either political branch of the 
Government. . . . While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this polit-
ical branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”271 
Yet Congress as an institution is even more responsive to voters’ 
policy preferences for any number of familiar reasons.  First, while agen-
cy officials are indirectly accountable through the president, Representa-
tives and Senators are directly accountable in that they regularly must 
take their records to their constituents and run for reelection.  Another 
important difference has to do with the frequency of elections.  Voters 
only have the opportunity to register their disapproval of agency policy 
choices in quadrennial presidential elections.  By contrast, a new Con-
gress is constituted every two years.  Finally, Congress’s smaller consti-
tuencies ensure a tighter nexus between the representative and the 
represented.  The typical Congressman serves a constituency of around 
600,000, give or take,272 and a single Senator’s constituency can range 
from nearly 500,000 to almost 34 million.273  But an agency official (like 
the president she serves) counts as her constituency the nation’s entire 
 
 271. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
 272. See Jim Abrams, House Restores Partial Vote to Nonstate Delegates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Jan. 25, 2007, at A3. 
 273. In the 2000 census, the least populous state, Wyoming, had a population of 493,782.  Califor-
nia, the nation’s most populous state, boasted a population of 33,871,648.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
POPULATION, HOUSING UNITS, AREA, AND DENSITY: 2000, available at http://factfinder. 
census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=n&_lang=en&mt_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_GCTPH1R_US9S& 
format=US-9S&box_head_nbr=GCT-PH1-R&ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&geo_id=01000US. 
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population of 300 million.274  An individual voter’s preference thus has 
less weight with an agency official than with a Senator or member of the 
House.  Further, insofar as agencies are politically accountable, it is often 
a consequence of legislative oversight and control. 
The question then becomes which legal rules would channel the 
maximum amount of policymaking responsibility to Congress and away 
from agencies.  One obvious candidate is the nondelegation doctrine, but 
modern courts have shown little appetite for applying that principle in a 
meaningfully robust way.275  A no-deference rule may be a plausible subs-
titute.  Denying Chevron deference to agencies’ views on the magnitude 
of their own jurisdiction would, in at least some circumstances, allocate 
to Congress more responsibility for making basic policy calls. 
In a system that extends Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional 
interpretations, Congress might write vague laws for any number of rea-
sons.  A statute might be ambiguous for the simple reason that Congress 
had no view on whether a given agency should have jurisdiction over a 
given matter, or could not have foreseen that the agency conceivably 
might exercise jurisdiction over the matter.276  Less creditable reasons ex-
ist as well.  Congress might enact ambiguous legislation because its 
members could not reach a consensus on a hotly disputed issue, and a 
vague generality was the most they could agree on.277  Next, Congress 
might be able to agree, but it fears its decision to extend or withhold 
agency jurisdiction will prove unpopular.  Ambiguity lets Congress pass 
the buck to the agency.  Vague legislation can help mask legislative poli-
cy choices and thus insulate members from anticipated public backlash; 
ambiguity externalizes at least some of the costs of adopting controver-
sial policies.278  Finally, Congress might be vague because it wants to 
maintain its future flexibility in overseeing the executive branch.  Laws 
 
 274. Further, insofar as administrative agencies are subject to capture, they are likely to be more 
responsive to concentrated interests, economic and otherwise, and even less responsive to broader 
public concerns. 
 275. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
 276. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) (“The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in appli-
cation is not that they are poorly drafted—though many are—and not that the legislators failed to 
agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute—though often they do fail—but that a 
statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will 
be encountered in, its application.”). 
 277. See Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2007) 
(“Congress may choose to enact an ambiguous statute as a compromise to ensure the statute’s passage; 
by being purposely vague, legislative drafters can generate sufficient support for a statute that would 
fail to become law were sensitive issues definitively resolved through clear and detailed statutory lan-
guage.”). 
 278. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 2085, 2155 (2002) (emphasizing that “ambiguity allows Congress to evade accountability,” and to 
“shift the dirty work of legislation to the courts”). 
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that are ambiguous give Congress the discretion to decide, at some point 
in the future, whether to praise or condemn an agency for asserting or 
disclaiming jurisdiction depending on which way the (currently unknow-
able) political winds are blowing at the time.279  In each of these circums-
tances, Congress is effectively delegating to implementing agencies the 
responsibility for making policy determinations that the statute could, 
but does not, resolve. 
Our proposal would make it more difficult for Congress to shirk its 
policymaking responsibilities, and thereby encourage greater legislative 
precision, in at least some cases.  Denying Chevron deference on jurisdic-
tional questions would not prevent statutes whose ambiguity is caused by 
Congress’s failure to express any intention on, or anticipate any disputes 
involving, the bounds of an agency’s authority.  By definition, Congress is 
not deciding whether a given agency should possess a given power, so the 
future availability of judicial deference will not influence that decision 
making in the present day. 
The no-deference rule is likely to prove more valuable when ambi-
guity results from a lack of congressional consensus.  Where policy dif-
ferences prevent agreement, legislators might see statutory indetermina-
cy as a second-best alternative:  Members on both sides of the question 
can hold out hope that an agency or court will construe the ambiguity in 
a way that achieves their hoped-for policy goals.  And legislators know 
that they will be able to pressure an agency to adopt the “right” construc-
tion by holding a well-timed oversight hearing, sending a letter to the 
agency head, and so on.280  If, on the other hand, members of Congress 
know that agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations will not receive judicial 
deference—and, therefore, that agencies will have less room to maneuv-
er when making policy choices—they are likely to invest more resources 
in trying to achieve the previously elusive consensus.  (Or, where reach-
ing agreement would be prohibitively costly, they may not legislate on 
the question at all.)  In other words, the no-deference rule alters the cost-
benefit calculus for enacting ambiguous legislation.  It reduces the bene-
fits that legislators can expect to gain from writing laws that fail to re-
solve whether an agency is to wield a particular power. 
The same is true of ambiguities deriving from Congress’s efforts to 
shield unpopular jurisdictional decisions from public view.  Imagine that 
Congress secretly hopes the FDA will exercise jurisdiction over tobacco 
products, but wants the agency to take any political heat for doing so.  
One way to accomplish that is to enact laws that are ambiguous regard-
 
 279. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 260, at 37. 
 280. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The 
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 641 (2002). 
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ing the boundaries of FDA power, and then quietly prod the agency to 
act.  Our no-deference rule would make that strategy less attractive.  De-
nying Chevron deference to the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction over to-
bacco products reduces the FDA’s ability to initiate the expansion of its 
own regulatory authority, thereby decreasing the benefits that Congress 
can expect to gain from the ambiguity-and-prod two-step.  For similar 
reasons, the no-deference rule reduces Congress’s incentives to enact 
ambiguous legislation that preserves its ability to denounce agencies’ ju-
risdictional choices at a later date.  Staying with our example, the FDA 
will not be making jurisdictional choices, so Congress has little, if any-
thing, to gain from keeping its powder dry today and opening fire on the 
FDA tomorrow. 
Candidly, there is some risk that a no-deference rule will produce 
negative legislative incentives of its own.  Our proposal would extend de-
ference (albeit not Chevron deference) to agency jurisdictional interpre-
tations involving factual predicates.  In effect, we are establishing a safe 
harbor, and Congress naturally will want to take advantage of it.  A legis-
lature that is determined to punt jurisdictional questions to agencies thus 
will have an incentive to write statutes that are framed in factual-
predicate terms—thereby restoring at least some of the benefits Congress 
can expect to gain from ambiguous legislation. 
We acknowledge the force of this concern, and we share it.  But we 
do not believe it represents a fatal flaw in our proposal.  First, the same 
interests that motivate legislators to enact ambiguous laws—a lack of 
consensus, the desire to hide unpopular decisions, a wish to pivot in fu-
ture political winds—also might dissuade them from specifying in a sta-
tute the predicates necessary to trigger agency jurisdiction.  Suppose 
Congress wants to avoid deciding whether or not the CFTC may, in the 
course of adjudicating violations of federal commodities law, decide re-
lated state-law counterclaims.281  Congress could write a statute identify-
ing predicates whose presence would establish CFTC counterclaim juris-
diction—for example, “The Commission may exercise jurisdiction if the 
cost of litigating the counterclaim separately would exceed $100,000”—
thereby leaving the ultimate decision whether to exercise jurisdiction up 
to the agency.  But doing so would defeat Congress’s reasons for prefer-
ring ambiguity.  Statutorily specifying the predicates would draw atten-
tion to the issue, thereby limiting legislators’ ability to escape responsibil-
ity both for their own choices and for the agency’s subsequent 
implementation of those choices.  In short, a no-deference rule might 
create an incentive for Congress to frame legal problems as factual predi-
 
 281. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1986). 
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cates, but Congress also will have a countervailing incentive to refrain 
from drawing attention to the issue, which is exactly what a factual-
predicate statute would do. 
Second, even if our proposal does not eliminate the incentive to 
enact ambiguous statutes in every single instance, it will still have a bene-
ficial effect in at least some cases.  If nothing else, our proposal would 
make Congress work harder to write statutes framed in factual-predicate 
terms.  Instead of simply saying that the Commission may issue an order 
awarding actual damages proximately caused by a violation of the Com-
modity Exchange Act,282 Congress would need to expend scarce legisla-
tive resources to come to consensus on a more detailed list of jurisdic-
tional triggers.  That would marginally increase the costs of enacting laws 
that punt jurisdictional questions to agencies.  In some unknown number 
of instances, the additional costs would be enough to outweigh the ex-
pected benefits of ambiguity and thus dissuade Congress from enacting a 
vague law.  Our no-deference proposal might not be a complete solution, 
but it does a better job of maximizing congressional control over policy-
making than a rule of jurisdictional deference. 
b. Agencies 
A no-deference rule would not just encourage Congress to shoulder 
greater responsibility for making basic policy choices.  It also would re-
duce opportunities for agencies to improperly arrogate policymaking 
power to themselves. 
In a system that extends Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional 
interpretations, agencies will have strong incentives to exercise powers 
Congress did not intend for them to wield, or to extend their powers 
beyond what Congress envisioned.283  Imagine an agency that is deciding, 
in a deference regime, whether to assert jurisdiction over a given matter.  
(The calculus would be the same for an agency choosing whether to dis-
claim jurisdiction, but for now we will focus solely on the former choice.)  
The agency will claim jurisdiction if it expects the benefits of doing so to 
exceed the costs.  The benefit of asserting jurisdiction will be equal to the 
value of the claimed power (e.g., its usefulness in achieving the agency’s 
regulatory priorities) discounted by the probability that a court will strike 
it down as ultra vires.  (The agency may use other factors to discount the 
value of the claimed power, including the probability that an assertion of 
 
 282. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 283. See supra notes 21–30 and accompanying text; see also Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 16, at 
996 (arguing that the availability of Chevron deference encourages agencies to make “broad claims of 
jurisdiction into areas long thought to be outside their jurisdiction”). 
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jurisdiction would produce unwelcome political controversy.)  A defe-
rence rule reduces the probability of judicial invalidation.  That in turn 
increases the anticipated benefit to the agency of aggrandizement, there-
by increasing the incidence of aggrandizement.  And we believe that 
agency aggrandizement is undesirable for the same accountability-based 
reasons that we prefer congressional policymaking. 
The argument in favor of a no-deference rule is fairly straightfor-
ward.  By denying Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional interpreta-
tions, our proposal helps minimize these natural incentives to aggrandize.  
In particular, refusing to analyze jurisdictional questions under the Che-
vron framework increases the likelihood that courts will invalidate an 
agency’s claim of authority to regulate a particular field, thereby decreas-
ing the benefits the agency can expect to gain from asserting jurisdiction.  
In at least some cases, that will reduce the agency’s expected benefits to a 
value less than the anticipated costs.  And that means less aggrandize-
ment.  It is important to emphasize, again, that a no-deference rule 
would not necessarily create an anti-regulatory bias.  Agency aggran-
dizement can take any number of forms.  Sometimes it comes as a wolf in 
the form of assertions of jurisdiction.  But sometimes it comes in the 
sheep’s clothing of jurisdictional disclaimers.284  Our proposal to deny 
Chevron deference would alter the cost-benefit calculus for agencies con-
sidering disclaimers of jurisdiction as well as assertions.  A no-deference 
rule would help curb aggrandizement (whatever form it may take), not 
assertions of jurisdiction as such. 
While a no-deference rule helps mitigate the tendency to aggran-
dize, there is also a possibility that it could create unfavorable incentives 
in agencies similar to the ones that might materialize in Congress.  Spe-
cifically, agencies might try to take advantage of the safe harbor by at-
tempting to characterize any given dispute as a factual-predicate case in-
stead of an existence or scope case.  Restoring Chevron deference to this 
subset of jurisdictional disputes would result in (at least some) opportun-
ities to aggrandize. 
Yet our sense is that agencies would enjoy only modest success at 
dressing up existence or scope cases in the garb of factual predicates.  
This is so because whether a given dispute plausibly can be described in 
factual-predicate terms will depend, not just on the agency’s determina-
tion and ingenuity, but on the way the specific underlying statute is writ-
ten.  And that is largely beyond the agency’s control.  Some statutes 
 
 284. Compare FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (FDA as-
serts authority to regulate tobacco products under the FDCA), with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497, 504 (2007) (EPA asserts that it lacks statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act). 
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present factual-predicate problems quite clearly—for example, a statute 
that calls on an agency to determine whether a quantity of natural gas 
moved from one state to another,285 or a statute that directs an agency to 
decide whether certain goods were transported on public highways.286  
Other statutes, because of the way Congress has chosen to write them, 
cannot easily be pegged into the factual-predicate hole.  These difficul-
ties are especially pronounced in statutory-silence cases.  If a statute is 
silent on the existence of jurisdiction, by definition it cannot include pre-
dicates whose presence will trigger jurisdiction.  One would struggle 
mightily to describe the failure of the Railway Labor Act to expressly 
deny the National Mediation Board the power to investigate railway em-
ployees’ representation disputes as conditioning agency jurisdiction upon 
the presence of certain factual predicates.287  Likewise, the silence of the 
ADA on whether the DOT had authority to impose money damages on 
noncompliant bus companies cannot plausibly be described as presenting 
a factual-predicate problem.288  In short, an agency’s ability to take ad-
vantage of the factual-predicates safe harbor is limited by the terms of 
the statutes Congress has enacted.  An agency might pressure Congress 
to rewrite the underlying statute in terms more amenable to factual-
predicate analysis, but as discussed above there are limits to Congress’s 
willingness to do so. 
Even if agencies were successful in recasting a not-insignificant 
number of jurisdictional matters to take advantage of the safe harbor, 
that would not fatally undermine our case for a no-deference rule.  A lit-
tle aggrandizement is better than a lot of aggrandizement.  Agencies al-
ready have an incentive to accumulate new powers.  Our proposal would 
channel that incentive into a single category—factual predicate cases—
and thereby reduce the opportunities for it to be expressed.  In a system 
where courts announce that they will defer to agencies’ jurisdictional in-
terpretations (or where there is uncertainty about whether they will do 
so), whether an agency is able to aggrandize will depend upon little more 
than the agency’s desire to aggrandize.  Under our proposal, an agency’s 
ability to aggrandize is a function not just of the agency’s druthers but of 
how Congress has written its organic statute.  Because that will be largely 
out of agencies’ control, even an imperfect no-deference regime will 
mean less aggrandizement. 
 
 285. See Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 286. See P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 548–49 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 287. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 658, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(en banc). 
 288. Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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3. Agency Self-Aggrandizement 
That brings us to a third reason why courts should decline to afford 
Chevron deference to agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations—“foxes 
should not guard henhouses.”289  In the broadest terms, “In Anglo-
American law, those limited by law are generally not empowered to de-
cide on the meaning of the limitation.”290  As we have seen, entrusting 
agencies with the responsibility of determining the extent of their powers 
poses too great a risk of aggrandizement.291  For that reason, as Professor 
Sunstein and others have argued, it is unreasonable to suppose that Con-
gress meant to give agencies such authority:  “Congress would be unlike-
ly to want agencies to have the authority to decide on the extent of their 
own powers.”292 
There are two discrete ideas here.  The first is a guess about Con-
gress’s probable intentions—namely, it would not have meant to grant 
agencies the authority to determine the extent of their jurisdiction.  No 
evidence is mustered to support that conjecture, but at least it’s in good 
company; disputes over the proper scope of Chevron’s domain are rife 
with competing undefended presumptions.293  The second idea is that, ir-
respective of what Congress may have expected, courts should not ac-
quiesce to agencies’ efforts to define their own powers.  Again, the 
source of such a norm is not identified, but a few obvious candidates 
spring to mind: judicially defined and policed functionalist principles 
(themselves derived from Anglo-American legal traditions) designed to 
 
 289. Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 446 
(1989). 
 290. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 31, at 2097; see also NORMAN J. SINGER, 3 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.2 (2001) (“[T]he general rule applied to statutes 
granting powers to [agencies] is that only those powers are granted which are conferred either express-
ly or by necessary implication.”). 
 291. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944) (“[D]etermination of 
the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him in 
whom authority is vested.”); see also Armstrong, supra note 21. 
 292. Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 31, at 2099; see also Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra 
note 16, at 994 (“When agency self-interest is directly implicated, such as when it must decide whether 
an area previously unregulated by the agency should now come within its jurisdiction, the justifications 
for deference fade. . . .  It is here that concern about agency aggrandizement is at its highest.”); Merrill 
& Hickman, supra note 12, at 867 (“If Congress describes the agency’s mandate in a way that contains 
gaps or ambiguities (which is inevitable), and Chevron requires courts to defer to any reasonable in-
terpretation of these gaps and ambiguities, then Chevron seems to offer an opening for agency ag-
grandizement (or abrogation), without any effective judicial check.”). 
 293. See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381–82 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (presuming, without citing evidence, that “Congress would na-
turally expect that the agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities in its 
statutory authority or jurisdiction”); id. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing, without citing evi-
dence, that “we cannot presume that Congress implicitly intended an agency to fill ‘gaps’ in a statute 
confining the agency’s jurisdiction”); cf. Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 235 (acknowledging that 
“the claim about what ‘Congress would naturally expect’ is a fiction”). 
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check the exercise of power; or an “administrative common law”294 that, 
for similar reasons, seeks to constrain agency discretion; or perhaps even 
a court-enforced nondelegation doctrine. 
In its crude form, the argument about foxes and henhouses is not 
especially persuasive.295 An initial observation is that analyzing jurisdic-
tional questions under the Chevron framework does not allow agencies 
to “decide” conclusively the extent of their own powers.  Agencies do 
not have the last word; their jurisdictional interpretations are still subject 
to judicial review under Chevron step two.  And while Chevron’s reason-
ableness requirement does not have much bite, it is possible to imagine 
agency assertions of jurisdiction that would plainly run afoul of it296—for 
example, if the FDA asserted authority to regulate tractor-trailers that 
haul medications as “devices” under the FDCA, on the ground that the 
trucks are “machine[s]” that are “intended for use in the . . . cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of disease.”297 
A more fundamental problem with the foxes-and-henhouses argu-
ment is that government actors in many other circumstances have the fi-
nal say on whether or not they may wield a particular power.  Federal 
courts routinely decide whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction to 
decide a particular case—i.e., whether Article III of the Constitution 
confers that power on them.  The abstention doctrines also give courts 
the last word on whether to exercise their jurisdiction in a variety of dis-
putes, for example, ones involving the constitutionality of a state law 
whose meaning is unclear,298 or a state law that is particularly complex.299  
Likewise, the political question doctrine gives Congress free rein to de-
cide the extent of certain of its powers.  The Senate enjoys unchecked 
discretion on how to exercise its authority to try impeachments,300 and 
each house is solely responsible for carrying out its power to expel a 
 
 294. Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 607 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 295. That may be one reason why Professor Sunstein appears to have overcome his previous 
skepticism of entrusting jurisdictional questions to agencies.  In his most recent discussion of the issue, 
Professor Sunstein argues that “any exemption of jurisdictional questions” from the Chevron frame-
work “is vulnerable on two grounds.”  Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 13, at 235.  First, echoing Justice 
Scalia, “the line between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is far from clear.”  Id.  Second, 
agency assertions of jurisdiction typically are due to the influence of “democratic forces” or the agen-
cy’s “own specialized competence”—which of course are two classic rationales for Chevron deference.  
Id. 
 296. See Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“We 
would not, of course, be obliged to rubber-stamp an agency’s interpretation of those, or any other, 
statutory silences; any such interpretation would still have to satisfy the reasonableness test of Che-
vron step two.”). 
 297. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006). 
 298. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941). 
 299. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332–34 (1943). 
 300. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–34 (1993). 
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member.301  Why should federal courts and Congress be trusted to guard 
henhouses, but not administrative agencies? 
A somewhat more refined version of the argument would begin 
with the proposition that judges and legislators are less likely to succumb 
to aggrandizement than administrative agencies.  Allowing courts to de-
cide the extent of their own jurisdiction raises weaker aggrandizement 
concerns because they are constrained by Article III’s case or controver-
sy requirement.  By their very nature, courts are reactive.  A court can-
not initiate a proceeding to assert jurisdiction over a given field or activi-
ty, and it cannot issue an advisory opinion.  It must wait for parties with 
standing to put forward a justiciable claim.  Even courts that are deter-
mined to expand their powers thus are limited in their ability to do so.302  
Justiciability requirements therefore can be seen as a means by which the 
court-as-fox problem is managed.303 
The same can be said of Congress, though to a lesser extent.  Con-
gress likewise appears to be reactive, at least with respect to impeach-
ment, expulsion, and other areas where its ability to define its powers is 
largely unchecked (though certainly not with respect to the enactment of 
substantive legislation).  In recent American history, Congress has not 
used its impeachment or expulsion powers to advance broad policy ob-
jectives—for example, removing officeholders whose policies are abhor-
rent to a congressional majority.304  Instead, Congress typically com-
mences impeachment proceedings or seeks to expel a member only after 
an independent investigation has uncovered plausible evidence of crimi-
nal wrongdoing.305  Unlike the federal courts, Congress is not bound by 
formal doctrine that requires it to exercise its impeachment and expul-
sion powers in a reactive way.  Yet in practice, that is exactly what it 
does, and the risk of aggrandizement is therefore somewhat lessened. 
In contrast to the passivity that characterizes the courts and (in re-
levant respects) Congress, administrative agencies are proactive.  Agen-
 
 301. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506–12 (1969).  The political question doctrine does not, 
of course, insulate a decision by Congress to refuse to seat a member.  See id. at 548–49. 
 302. See Molot, supra note 231, at 1304 (“[I]n an important respect, the institutional setting within 
which judges operate renders them less likely than political actors to be motivated predominantly by a 
desire merely to implement their own political ideology.”). 
 303. This rationale may pose problems for Professor Sunstein in particular, who has taken a ra-
ther broad view of standing and justiciability requirements.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Stand-
ing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 180 (1992). 
 304. The Reconstruction Congress’s efforts to remove President Andrew Johnson from office are 
an obvious counterexample. 
 305. For instance, Congress refused to seat Representative Adam Clayton Powell—as distinct 
from expelling him—after he was accused of corruption.  President Nixon was threatened with im-
peachment after an independent counsel uncovered evidence of his complicity in the Watergate break-
in.  Federal judge Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed after he was indicted for (and later ac-
quitted of) accepting a bribe and committing perjury.  And President Clinton was impeached after an 
independent counsel uncovered evidence of alleged perjury and obstruction of justice. 
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cies are “policy entrepreneurs.”306  Not only do they propose solutions to 
commonly recognized social problems, but they also sometimes seek to 
persuade the public that there is a problem that needs solving in the first 
place.  This entrepreneurship is facilitated by the extraordinarily broad 
statutory charges that agencies often are given:  The FCC is to regulate 
the airwaves in a way that serves the “public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity,”307 the EPA is to protect air quality with an “adequate margin of 
safety,”308 and so on.  Agencies thus enjoy fairly wide discretion to decide 
whether to initiate proceedings to assert jurisdiction over particular sec-
tors of the economy or particular activities. 
In these circumstances, where neither hard legal rules nor soft insti-
tutional norms constrain the assertion of agency jurisdiction, there is a 
greater risk of aggrandizement.  One solution is for courts to refuse to 
apply the Chevron framework to questions involving agency jurisdiction, 
and instead resolve such matters independently.  (Another would be a 
judicially enforced nondelegation doctrine, but courts have shown little 
interest in reviving that principle.309)  In effect, a rule that denies Chevron 
deference to agency jurisdictional interpretations is a substitute for the 
justiciability doctrines that constrain courts from arrogating power to 
themselves and for the institutional culture that prevents Congress from 
using impeachment and expulsion as policymaking instruments. 
V. THE OBJECTIONS 
There are several potential objections to our proposal.  Some of 
them have been addressed above.  Here we seek to respond to the two 
most prominent—and in our view most difficult—objections.  First and 
foremost, there is the difficulty (some would say impossibility) of distin-
guishing jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional questions.  In other words, 
a no-deference rule increases courts’ decision costs.  This objection is 
both strong in its own right, and strengthens other objections when con-
sidered in combination with them.  Second is the possibility that denying 
Chevron deference in the jurisdictional context will force courts to en-
gage in policymaking, which is one of the outcomes the Chevron doctrine 
is intended to avoid.  In addition, some contend, denial of deference in 
the jurisdictional context threatens to undermine the principles upon 
which Chevron depends.  While we believe each of these objections has 
 
 306. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 370 (1980). 
 307. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006); see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 
(1943). 
 308. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006) (requiring the EPA to set national ambient air quality 
standards at a level “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety”). 
 309. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
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some merit, we do not believe that either is fatal to our proposal.  Warts 
and all, a no-deference rule is superior to the available alternatives. 
A. Distinguishing Jurisdictional Actions from Nonjurisdictional Actions 
Perhaps the most compelling objection to our proposal comes from 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Missis-
sippi ex rel. Moore.310  Courts lack the ability to distinguish the jurisdic-
tional actions that would be subject to a no-deference rule from other 
types of actions; they simply do not know it when they see it.  According 
to Justice Scalia, “[T]here is no discernable line between an agency’s ex-
ceeding its authority and an agency’s exceeding authorized application of 
its authority.”311  “Virtually any administrative action can be characte-
rized” as either jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional “depending upon how 
generally one wishes to describe the ‘authority.’”312  At best, Scalia sug-
gests, denying Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional interpretations 
would be futile, since courts cannot identify the class of disputes that 
would be subject to the rule.  At worst, a no-deference rule would make 
it possible for courts to predetermine outcomes in particular cases by 
manipulating the standard of review.  Under this view, refusing to extend 
Chevron to jurisdictional questions does not prevent aggrandizement.  It 
simply substitutes the risk of judicial aggrandizement for the risk of 
agency aggrandizement.313 
These criticisms have considerable force, but are ultimately unper-
suasive.  For starters, we suspect that it will be quite easy for courts to 
 
 310. 487 U.S. 354, 377–81 (1988). 
 311. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 312. Id.; see also, e.g., Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 676–77 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, any issue may readily be characterized 
as jurisdictional merely by manipulating the level of generality at which it is framed.”); Cope, supra 
note 16, at 1340–42; Crawford, supra note 16, at 968–69. 
 313. Professor Vermeule similarly argues that the entire “step zero” project—including, by impli-
cation, this Article’s efforts to cordon off jurisdictional questions from Chevron’s domain—is fatally 
flawed.  According to Professor Vermeule, “step zero” replaces Chevron’s simple rule-like approach 
with a standards-based, “fine-grained jurisprudence of deference.”  Vermeule, supra note 202, at 347.  
By moving from a rule to a standard, “step zero” analysis makes it more costly for courts to reach de-
cisions, increases uncertainty for litigants, forces judges and lawyers to devote more resources to liti-
gating over standards of review, and externalizes the costs of decisionmaking from the Supreme Court 
to lower courts.  See id. at 356–58.  We do not deny that our no-deference rule poses at least some risk 
of greater decision costs (though, as the rest of Part V.A explains, these costs are likely to be smaller 
than critics fear).  More importantly, we have a fundamentally different understanding of what Che-
vron is trying to accomplish.  Professor Vermeule and other “step zero” critics (including Justice Sca-
lia) see Chevron primarily as a tool for minimizing judicial discretion and promoting efficiency.  They 
therefore are more willing to tolerate the risk of agency aggrandizement.  We see Chevron (as clarified 
in Mead) as a partial solution to the problem of excessive agency discretion.  We therefore are more 
willing to tolerate the risk of decisional inefficiencies (though we share the concern about possible 
judicial overreach).  To put it somewhat crudely, we worry more about agency aggrandizement than 
we do about judges and lawyers working harder. 
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classify as jurisdictional those cases that involve agency claims about sta-
tutory silences.314  Concerns about the slippery boundary between an 
agency that “exceed[s] its authority” as such and an agency that “ex-
ceed[s] authorized application of its authority” are weak when the agen-
cy cannot point to any statutory basis to support what it has done.315  
When a statute is silent—i.e., when Congress has failed to authorize an 
agency to act—there can be no “authorized applications” of a particular 
agency power, because the agency simply does not have that power.  
Even if one shares Justice Scalia’s aversion to courts playing with the 
level of generality at which an agency’s authority is described, one could 
still embrace a no-deference rule for statutory-silence cases that—by de-
finition—involve Congress denying authority to the agency. 
In other jurisdictional cases, ones that do not involve statutory si-
lences, critics might be overestimating the magnitude of the decision 
costs.  Our sense is that the challenge of distinguishing jurisdictional ac-
tions from nonjurisdictional ones is unlikely to arise in most cases.  The 
line-drawing problems that most readily come to mind involve uncertain-
ty over whether a particular agency action implicates the existence of 
power or the scope of power, not whether it is properly classified as ju-
risdictional.  One might dispute whether the FDA’s claim of authority to 
regulate tobacco products is better described as an existence problem 
(“the FDA is asserting power to regulate an entire industry”) or as a 
scope problem (“the FDA’s power to regulate drugs and devices is being 
extended to particular types of drugs and devices”).316  But there does not 
appear to be much doubt that the FDA’s claim is a jurisdictional one.  
Likewise, reasonable minds can differ on whether the FCC’s refusal to 
regulate cable companies’ broadband Internet services was a denial of 
the existence of jurisdiction (“the FCC is disclaiming power to regulate 
an entire industry”) or a restriction on the scope of jurisdiction (“the 
FCC’s power to regulate telecommunications services does not reach ca-
ble broadband”).317  But, again, it is pretty easily classified as a jurisdic-
tional case (and our proposal would deny Chevron deference in either 
event). 
 
 314. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The Commission ap-
parently assumed—without reasoning—that it could extend its regulatory authority over attorneys 
engaged in the practice of law with no other basis than the observation that the Act did not provide for 
an exemption.”); Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater, 17 NDLR ¶ 166 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 1999), available at 1999 
WL 986849, at *22 (“The plain language indicates that Congress did not explicitly forbid the Secretary 
from including a compensation mechanism in the [bus] accessibility regulations.”). 
 315. Miss. Power, 487 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 316. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000). 
 317. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989–99 (2005). 
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To be sure, in some cases the line demarcating existence from scope 
could be quite difficult to draw with any precision—perhaps prohibitively 
so.  This is a principal reason why we argue that courts should analyze 
scope questions the same way they analyze existence questions; Chevron 
should not apply to either.318  But the boundaries between jurisdictional 
and nonjurisdictional actions ordinarily will be considerably less murky.  
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s Mississippi Power & Light concurrence seems to 
acknowledge this.  That case—in which the Court held that the FERC 
could require a Mississippi utility to purchase power from a nuclear 
plant—did not involve any dispute over whether, “in reviewing the 
wholesale rates charged to the participants in such a[n electricity pooling] 
venture, FERC has jurisdiction to determine whether the venture was 
prudent as a whole.”319  Nor, according to Justice Scalia, 
is it seriously contested that in general FERC has jurisdiction to de-
termine a fair allocation of the cost of the facility among the utilities 
in the pool. . . . The central controverted issue in the present case is 
whether FERC has jurisdiction to determine the prudence of a par-
ticular utility’s participation in the pool.320 
Not only was Justice Scalia able to successfully identify the issue in the 
case as a jurisdictional one, but he also managed to distinguish among a 
number of possible jurisdictional disputes that might conceivably be pre-
sented to the Court.  We suspect that, in many cases, courts will find it 
just as easy to tell a jurisdictional action from a nonjurisdictional one. 
What about the hard cases?  Even here, we suspect the difficulties 
are exaggerated.  The fact that judges may have trouble drawing lines 
does not mean that it is impossible to do so.  Nor, more importantly, does 
it relieve them of their responsibility of doing so.  It might be difficult to 
determine the precise boundaries dividing jurisdictional actions from 
nonjurisdictional ones, but that does not mean that they are one and the 
same—the categories are still analytically valid even if their borders are 
“fuzzy.”321  As Deborah Jones Merritt has argued in the Commerce 
Clause context, the exact position of the line is often unclear, but some 
things are closer to interstate commerce than others.322  The category of 
jurisdictional questions, like interstate commerce, “birds and baldness, is 
not a crisp set.”323  But that does not make it inherently unsuitable to 
judicial enforcement. 
 
 318. See supra Part III. 
 319. Mississippi Power, 487 U.S. at 378 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 739–50 (1995) (applying con-
cept of “fuzzy logic” to question of what constitutes “commerce”). 
 322. Indeed, this is part of the reason that the pre–New Deal Court’s Commerce Clause decisions 
are so routinely criticized for their inconsistencies.  See id. at 684–85. 
 323. Id. at 742. 
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In administrative law (as in other contexts), courts are called upon 
to draw fuzzy lines all the time, including jurisdictional ones.  Professor 
Noah has observed that courts sometimes “have to mediate ‘turf battles’ 
between agencies with apparently overlapping jurisdiction.”324  If courts 
are competent to determine (without repairing to Chevron) that, for ex-
ample, the SEC lacks authority to regulate a financial instrument be-
cause the CFTC has that power,325 there is no reason to believe it will be 
more difficult to say whether the SEC has jurisdiction in the absence of 
another agency’s claim of authority.  Similar line-drawing problems arise 
in other administrative law contexts.  It may not be immediately obvious 
whether an agency rule is legislative (requiring the agency to engage in 
notice-and comment-rulemaking) or interpretive (and therefore exempt 
from the APA’s notice and comment requirements).326  It might be un-
clear whether an agency action is properly classified as a rule at all, and 
not an adjudication.327  And courts might struggle to determine whether a 
particular action is committed to agency discretion by law (and hence 
immune from judicial review under the APA).328  Yet the courts manage 
to soldier through.  The distinction between a jurisdictional and nonju-
risdictional agency action does not appear in principle to be any more 
elusive than the distinction between, say, a legislative rule and an inter-
pretive rule.  Courts have managed successfully to draw lines between 
these and other categories, and there is no reason to suspect they will 
find it any harder to distinguish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional ac-
tions. 
Professor Eskridge and Lauren Baer suggest another basis for con-
trasting jurisdictional from non-jurisdictional interpretations: “whole-
sale” and “retail” applications.329  “When an agency expands its regula-
tions to a new category of applications, it is interpreting its own 
jurisdiction[,]” and is engaging in a “wholesale application of a statute.”330  
On the other hand, when the agency is applying its regulations or inter-
 
 324. Noah, supra note 16, at 1524. 
 325. See Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that “index par-
ticipations” were a type of futures contract that therefore were subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction and 
not the SEC’s). 
 326. See, e.g., Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236–37 
(D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 327. For instance, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763, 769 
(1969), disagreed on whether the Board had engaged in rulemaking or adjudication when, in Excelsior 
Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), it required an employer to provide a union with the names 
and addresses of its employees.  Compare Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 765 (plurality opinion) (the 
Excelsior Underwear order was a rule), and id. at 777 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same), and id. at 780 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (same), with id. at 770 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (the Excelsior 
Underwear order was an adjudication). 
 328. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 597 (1988). 
 329. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 154, at 1130. 
 330. Id. 
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preting a statutory provision “to a matter of detail,” it is not engaging in 
a jurisdictional interpretation and is engaged in a “retail application of a 
statute.”331  Likewise, when an agency focuses on factual predicates or 
premise facts in determining the application of its regulatory authority, it 
is engaged in “retail application.”332  Eskridge and Baer conclude, and we 
concur, that courts generally have the capacity to distinguish between 
such “wholesale” and “retail” applications.333 
This is not to deny that it may be quite difficult in some cases to say 
whether an agency’s action was jurisdictional or not.  When courts con-
front such circumstances, they may incur significant “predecision costs”334 
in ascertaining whether the action was jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.  
Even worse, there is at least some risk that—whether deliberately or un-
consciously—courts might choose whether to apply the deferential Che-
vron standard of review based on their sense of whether the agency’s ac-
tion ought to be sustained.  In the close cases that do arise, courts might 
use any number of factors to more systematically distinguish jurisdiction-
al actions from nonjurisdictional ones.  The list could include the follow-
ing (by no means exhaustive) considerations: 
• Is the agency invoking a statutory silence as the basis for its deci-
sion?  Or is it able to point to some specific (albeit perhaps ambi-
guous or inconclusive) statutory language to justify what it has 
done?  If the agency is unable to point to any authorization for its 
action other than Congress’s failure to rule it out, chances are 
greater that the action is jurisdictional. 
• How large is the class that is affected by the agency decision?  
Does it concern an entire field or industry, or only a few discrete 
players?  An action that affects the rights and responsibilities of 
many entities is more likely to be jurisdictional than an action 
that only concerns a few.335  So, for instance, an agency decision 
that has ramifications for farmers, manufacturers, and distribu-
tors—not to mention users!—of tobacco and tobacco-related 
products is more likely to be jurisdictional.336  The same goes for 
a decision on whether the Clean Air Act has anything to say 
about the emission of greenhouse gases from automobiles, power 
plants, factories, and other facilities used by virtually every 
 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Vermeule, supra note 202, at 356–57. 
 335. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 16, at 1009 (arguing that Chevron should not apply to 
agency assertions of jurisdiction that are “likely to have a major impact on the regulatory program and 
those being regulated”). 
 336. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–30 (2000). 
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American.337  By contrast, an agency decision that a particular 
importer’s day planners are “bound diaries” that are subject to 
tariffs is more likely to be nonjurisdictional.338 
• Is the agency acting for the first time after a lengthy period in 
which it indicated, either expressly or by implication, that it 
lacked authority to do what it does now?  Not all policy shifts he-
rald that the agency’s action is a jurisdictional one.  The DOT’s 
decision to rescind a requirement that automobile manufacturers 
install automatic seatbelts or air bags in their cars was not an ef-
fort to disclaim jurisdiction over vehicle safety.339  But some poli-
cy shifts do—for example, when the Army Corps of Engineers fi-
nally began to regulate wetlands under the Clean Water Act 
after a federal court ruled that it did in fact have statutory au-
thority to do so.340  The fact that an agency suddenly makes a 
choice it previously thought it legally could not make, when 
coupled with other factors, is a sign that the action may be juris-
dictional.341  The reverse would also be true, as when the Bush 
administration’s EPA concluded that it lacked the authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, despite the 
Clinton administration’s contrary view.342 
• Is there any independent evidence, other than the agency action 
being challenged, that the agency might be seeking to aggran-
dize?  The textbook example of a jurisdictional problem involves 
an agency asserting (or disclaiming) authority to regulate a given 
activity, industry, or field in order to pursue its own institutional 
interests.343  Needless to say, agencies can aggrandize in less dra-
matic ways than by claiming (or denying) jurisdiction, but the 
 
 337. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–30 (2007). 
 338. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 224–26 (2001).  There are some obvious coun-
terfactuals here.  Chevron itself involved an agency decision (endorsing the “bubble approach” under 
the Clean Air Act) that affected an entire industry (coal-fired power plants).  See Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  Yet we would not suggest that the 
EPA’s action was on that account jurisdictional and subject to our no-deference rule.  Rather, the size 
of the affected class is only one of several factors that, taken together, help draw the line between ju-
risdictional and nonjurisdictional actions. 
 339. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 44 (1983). 
 340. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 341. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 16, at 1012 (suggesting that Chevron deference may not 
be appropriate “if the agency has not previously regulated the product or service, or asserted the pow-
er to do so”). 
 342. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 
44,355 (proposed July 30, 2008). 
 343. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency denied that it had jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse 
gases in part because acknowledging that greenhouse gases contributed to climate change could have 
led the EPA to take actions that conflicted with agency leadership’s preference for market-based solu-
tions to environmental problems.  549 U.S. 497, 533–34 (2007). 
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presence of aggrandizement concerns is at least some indication 
that the dispute can fairly be described as jurisdictional.  Evi-
dence of aggrandizement could come in any number of forms, 
such as signs that an agency official is pursuing an initiative to 
build goodwill with stakeholders whose support she needs for fu-
ture projects,344 or indications that the agency disagrees with its 
congressional overseers on the priorities it should be focusing on. 
B. Jurisdictional Questions and Policy Considerations 
The potential difficulty in distinguishing jurisdictional from non-
jurisdictional questions may be the most serious objection against deny-
ing Chevron deference in the jurisdictional context, but it is hardly the 
only criticism of our proposal.  Another argument is that the various ra-
tionales proffered for the Chevron rule itself—such as agency expertise 
and separation of powers—counsel in favor of extending Chevron defe-
rence to jurisdictional questions.345 
Some may object that questions of regulatory jurisdiction are them-
selves policy questions that are better made by politically accountable 
branches than by the judiciary.  Justice Scalia has been a particularly 
forceful spokesman for this vision of agency action:  “Under our demo-
cratic system, policy judgments are not for the courts but for the political 
branches; Congress having left the policy question open, it much be ans-
wered by the Executive.”346  If Congress has failed to resolve a jurisdic-
tional question, the argument goes, then it is preferable to allow a politi-
cally accountable agency to resolve the matter in lieu of leaving the 
matter to unelected judges. 
The claim that jurisdictional questions are themselves merely policy 
questions of another sort is somewhat question-begging.  Agencies have 
the authority to set policies only if Congress has delegated them that 
power, and the ultimate issue in a jurisdictional case is precisely whether 
that delegation has taken place.  Whether to assert federal regulatory ju-
risdiction in any given context is itself a policy determination that must 
precede the existence of any agency authority to resolve the question.  If 
an agency lacks the authority to exercise jurisdiction, how could it have 
 
 344. For instance, FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk claimed authority to regulate television ad-
vertisements directed at children in part because: “I had come as the candidate of the consumer 
groups.  And I had to do something early to establish my good faith with them, because they were 
easily dissatisfied, and I felt it was important to maintain their trust.”  JOHN F. KENNEDY SCH. OF 
GOV’T, MIKE PERTSCHUK AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 13 (1981). 
 345. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 16, at 958 (“A rule of deference both recognizes the problems 
in distinguishing jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional interpretations and best upholds the policies be-
hind Chevron.”). 
 346. Scalia, supra note 171, at 515. 
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the power to resolve ambiguities about such jurisdiction?  One policy 
question is clearly antecedent to the other—and the jurisdictional deter-
mination is antecedent to the existence of agency power to resolve any 
ambiguity.  To presume a delegation of authority to resolve jurisdictional 
questions when there is no indication that Congress has granted such au-
thority in the first place would undermine the underlying requirement of 
a legislative delegation—which is the ultimate basis of the Chevron doc-
trine. 
In other words, whether a federal agency should have certain pow-
ers is certainly a policy question, but it is a policy question that ultimately 
must be resolved by the legislature.  Absent a legislative determination 
that produces a delegation, there is no agency authority at all.  This is 
why statutory silences constitute the absence of agency authority, and 
such silences do not, taken alone, constitute the sort of ambiguities that 
would trigger Chevron deference.  It is but a small extension to conclude 
that true ambiguity about the existence of jurisdiction is presumptive 
evidence of the absence of such jurisdiction, and not an implicit delega-
tion of authority. 
If this approach requires Congress to speak more clearly on such 
questions, so be it.  This is hardly a significant burden on the legislature.  
Indeed, given the weakness of the nondelegation doctrine—and the ab-
sence of any meaningful limit on Congress’s ability to delegate authority 
to administrative agencies—it is hardly too much to ask that Congress ac-
tually make such a delegation.  Indeed, the existence of such a default 
rule—a presumption that the failure to delegate is, in fact, a failure to 
delegate—serves to lessen the risk that courts will engage in impermissi-
ble policymaking.347 
Advocates of deference may argue that the existence of an ambigui-
ty in the jurisdictional context is no different than that in any other con-
text.  Such an ambiguity exists either because Congress was insufficiently 
clear about its intent, or because Congress had no intent other than to 
leave the question at issue to the relevant agency.348  Under Chevron’s 
progeny, there is little problem with this argument once it is established 
that a delegation to an agency has actually occurred.  Again, however, 
absent the determination that such a delegation has been made, there is 
 
 347. Of course it is an overstatement to suggest, as some deference advocates do, that courts can 
never engage in policy determinations.  To the contrary, courts can and must make policy determina-
tions with an eye toward potential policy consequences.  Indeed, as Scalia notes, “Policy evaluation 
is . . . part of the traditional judicial tool-kit that is used in applying the first step of Chevron . . . .”  Id. 
 348. Id. at 516 (“An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed 
to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear 
about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to 
the agency.”). 
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no basis for deferring to the agency in question.  It is no answer that 
Chevron assures Congress that ambiguities will be resolved by politically 
accountable administrative agencies, rather than courts, as Congress 
must know that it has delegated such authority to an agency for this 
question to be an issue.  Moreover, where Congress enacts statutes out-
side of the administrative law context, it does so knowing full well that 
any ambiguities in such statutes will be resolved by courts, so there is no 
reason to presume that Congress inevitably prefers leaving such ques-
tions in the hands of agencies rather than judges. 
Other objections are no more fatal to our proposal.  Quincy Craw-
ford argues that deference on jurisdictional questions is necessary for 
predictability and uniformity.349  Yet there are good reasons to wonder 
whether Chevron does in fact produce such predictability.  Chevron cer-
tainly may contribute to geographic uniformity—the meaning of “station-
ary source” under the Clean Air Act will mean the same thing in Los 
Angeles as in New York.  But Chevron may also undermine temporal un-
iformity—it enables agencies to change the meaning of statutory terms 
over time.350  Courts, particularly the lower courts that hear the bulk of 
cases in which agency claims are heard, are bound by precedent and in-
stitutional constraints that tend to produce a given degree of consistency 
and predictability.  Agencies themselves face fewer such constraints, as 
they may change their position whenever a change in political context or 
administration warrant.  Indeed, while Congress may have more ability 
to mau-mau agencies, agencies control changes more often than the judi-
ciary.  In both Brown & Williamson and Massachusetts v. EPA—
jurisdictional cases in which the Supreme Court refused to defer to the 
relevant agency’s statutory interpretations with regard to their own juris-
diction—political changes produced vast changes in agencies’ assess-
ments of their own jurisdictions, and the changes that occurred did so 
without any formal delegation from Congress.351  Maybe that flexibility is 
good, maybe not.  But at a minimum, it weakens the argument that Che-
vron is needed to ensure consistency in the law. 
A related critique is that vesting interpretive authority in courts ra-
ther than agencies will lead to ossification of regulatory law.  Leaving in-
terpretive decisions in the hands of agencies, on the other hand, allows 
agencies to revise their interpretations as circumstances or understanding 
of a given regulatory matter change.  This argument provides a strong 
 
 349. Crawford, supra note 16, at 968. 
 350. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (rejecting the notion 
“that every agency action representing a policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial 
than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance”). 
 351. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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justification for deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous subs-
tantive provisions, but is more problematic when applied to jurisdictional 
determinations.  Indeed, in the jurisdictional context, “judicial ossifica-
tion is in fact desirable and warranted . . . .”352  Agency authority only ex-
tends as far as the legislative delegation of authority, and such delegation 
“has outer parameters that courts should enforce.”353  Not only is this an 
underlying axiom of administrative law, but it is also evident in the APA 
requirement that courts invalidate agency actions “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”354 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly a quarter-century after the Supreme Court unwittingly proc-
laimed a “Chevron Revolution,”355 fundamental questions still linger 
about that decision’s basis, scope, and implications.  With Mead, we have 
an answer to at least one of them:  The Chevron framework is not based 
so much on agency expertise or on the need for nationwide regulatory 
uniformity, as it is based on a presumption about the circumstances in 
which Congress would want to delegate policymaking responsibility to an 
agency.  In particular, agencies are entitled to the Chevron treatment 
when there is evidence Congress has granted them interpretive authori-
ty—and statutory ambiguities, by themselves, do not count as the requi-
site evidence.  The question whether Congress has conferred power on 
an agency at all thus is prior to the question of whether deference is due 
to that agency’s statutory interpretation. 
That basic insight has important consequences for the perennially 
contested, and perpetually unresolved, question of whether agencies 
should receive Chevron deference when interpreting statutes that speak 
to the reach of their own jurisdiction.  For if delegation really is antece-
dent to deference, as Mead insists, it cannot be that courts should defer 
to an agency’s views on whether a delegation has taken place.  Deference 
comes into play only after a court convinces itself that Congress meant 
for a given agency to wield interpretive power.  That means courts must 
answer the threshold jurisdictional questions on their own, without let-
ting agencies do their dirty work for them. 
Mead and other familiar administrative-law norms are not the only 
reasons courts should be wary of extending Chevron deference to juris-
dictional questions.  Knowledge that agencies’ jurisdictional interpreta-
 
 352. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Mis-
conceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 712 (2007). 
 353. Id. at 713. 
 354. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006); see also Foote, supra note 352, at 713. 
 355. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 154, at 1085 (internal quotations omitted). 
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tions will be subject to Chevron could impede legislative deal-making in 
Congress.  A rule of deference creates incentives for Congress to enact 
vague laws that allow it to evade responsibility for its policy choices.  It 
also incentivizes the agencies themselves to aggrandize by decreasing the 
likelihood that courts will blow the whistle on their power-grabs.  By 
contrast, denying Chevron deference on jurisdictional questions would 
help facilitate legislative deals, encourage Congress to play a leading role 
in making basic policy choices, and frustrate imperial agencies’ ambitions 
to accumulate more and more power.  Chevron’s domain may be wide 
indeed, but that does not mean it should displace Congress and the 
courts from their traditional policymaking and adjudicative responsibili-
ties. 
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